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ASEAN'S GRADUAL EVOLUTION:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR INTEGRATING PARTICIPATORY
PROCEDURAL REFORMS FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT IN AN EVOLVING
RIGHTS-BASED FRAMEWORK

Tarik Abdel-Monem*
ABSTRACT:
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is
entering an interesting and important new phase in its evolution.
Having survived the cold war and Asian financial crisis of 1997,
the Association remains a uniquely successful, yet enigmatic organization comprised of ten major Southeast Asian countries.
ASEAN nations have successfully obtained rapid levels of economic and human development in the face of the region'spolitical
difficulties, yet at the risk of causing significant environmental degradation. Now, ASEAN is implementing two new structures that
have major implications for the state of civil society among its
member nations-theASEAN Charterand the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). This Article
examines ASEAN's overarching framework for environmental
governance, its normative culture of decision-making,and how the
Charterand AICHR could potentially offer significantly divergent
paths for the Association in light of its environmental and human
rights challenges. It particularly examines how the limitations of
ASEAN's elite governing and decision-making norms constrain
the possibilities for an expansive civil society under the Charter
and AICHR in these areas, and the challenges of integratingenvironmental and human rights paradigms within this context. Finally, this Article outlines some procedural reforms that ASEAN
should adopt that might address its developmental concerns from
a participatorystandpoint in light of the parameters that constrain
the Association's normative realities.
* University of Nebraska Public Policy Center. JD/MPH (University of Iowa).
E-mail: tarik@unl.edu - Phone: (402) 472-3147.
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INTRODUCTION

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN" or
"the Association" ) is entering its fifth decade. Widely perceived
as both an uncommon success and uniquely anomalous regional
association, ASEAN survived decades of revolution and Cold
War conflict to emerge as one of the world's leading economic
powers. Currently comprised of ten widely divergent economies
and governments, the Association continues to have significant
relevance as the common regional entity for Southeast Asia. As
ASEAN consolidates its standing among both its member-states
and its regional and global peers, the Association has arrived at a
crossroads. The recently created ASEAN Charter and ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)
provide significant opportunities for the Association to
strengthen both its environmental and human rights governance
approach-two areas that are both interrelated and in great need
of attention. As ASEAN's member-states continue to develop at
high rates of growth and integrate their domestic economies into
a wider market, environmental degradation remains a pressing
issue, particularly because of the relatively weak institutional and
civil society capacity of ASEAN nations. This article examines
the overall context of ASEAN's environmental governance
framework, and both the barriers and opportunities to potentially integrate new mechanisms for addressing environmental is-
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sues within a rights-based framework. Close attention is paid to
the normative space which has been developed by ASEAN's customary governance practices and principles, and how opportunities for establishing new practices would comport with such
boundaries. Finally, modest proposals are made that would further ASEAN progress on environmental matters within its evolving governance and rights framework using a participatory
approach.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview
of ASEAN's overall development since its inception. It outlines
the major instruments created by the Association, and the wider
trends that have characterized its economic evolution. It also
summarizes the general social and environmental concerns that
have arisen as a consequence of ASEAN's rapid economic development. Part III reviews the major components of ASEAN's environmental governance framework. This section provides an
overview of the soft law approach that ASEAN has developed
towards environmental affairs, particularly with respect to how
the Association's policymaking process draws from a wider culture of consensus and accommodation. It also outlines the Association's few hard law environmental treaties, such as the
Transboundary Haze Agreement, and how these protocols potentially limit significant normative interventions. Part IV outlines the parameters of the recently established ASEAN Charter
and ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
("AICHR"). This section discusses the limitations of these two
bodies both within the wider context of international environmental and human rights discourse, and within the policymaking
and diplomatic norms which characterize ASEAN's political culture. Specific attention is focused on the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Environmental Matters as a model for recognizing
participatory procedural rights that span environmental and
human rights concerns. Finally, Part V of this article examines
the AICHR both as a protective and promotion entity for addressing environmental concerns within a rights-based context.
Again drawing from parameters established by the policymaking
norms of ASEAN, a series of modest procedural-based reforms
to expand participatory practices are suggested for ASEAN as a
realistic step towards strengthening its approach towards the environment and human rights.
II.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT IN ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was founded in
1967, originally comprised of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
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pines, Singapore, and Thailand.' There were numerous reasons
supporting the formation of ASEAN. The five founding members shared security concerns over both communist Vietnam and
domestic communist insurgencies within their own borders. 2
There was fear among the founding states that communist China
might rise as an ascendant power and eclipse the smaller nations
of the region. 3 The formation of ASEAN also allayed security
tensions between members. The mid-1960s had seen several
years of Indonesia's konfrontasi (confrontation) with the Britishbacked Federation of Malaysia, 4 and the competing claims by
Malaysia and the Philippines for Sabah also threatened regional
security.5 The formation of the five nations into ASEAN stabilized relations between member-states, and facilitated connections between the non-communist countries of the region against
the perceived threats of North Vietnam and China. 6
A shared objective of economic development was a fundamental tenant of ASEAN. As noted in the first paragraph of the
1967 Bangkok Declaration establishing ASEAN:
[T]he aims and purposes of the Association shall be:
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and
cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful
community of South-East Asian Nations. 7
1. See

MICHAI]L ANToLIK, ASEAN AND THEP DIPLOMACY OF

AccoMMOIDA-

TION 3-5 (1990) (describing early history and meaning of ASEAN).
2. See Russell H. Fifield, ASEAN: Image and Reality, 19 ASIAN SuRy. 1199,

1199-1200 (1979) (outlining security concerns of ASEAN nations during the Indochina war).
3. See AMrrAv ACIARYA, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY: INTERNATIONAL RELAnONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 83-86 (2000) (noting the security concerns of ASEAN
partners and apprehension over China's possible dominance of Southeast Asian
nations).
4. See Ralf Emmers, Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia: A Study of Indonesian and Vietnam, 45 ASIAN SuRy. 645, 649-650 (2005)
(outlining the years of Konfrontasi under President Sukarno and President Suharto's
intention that ASEAN might "reassure his partners and diminish the fears of a coercive Indonesian hegemony").
5. See Paridah Abd. Samad & Darusalam Abu Bakar, Malaysia-Philippines
Relations: The Issue of Sabah, 32 ASIAN Suiav. 554, 554-558 (1992) (outlining the
historical tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah).

6. See Shaun Narine, ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security, 71
Ai+. 195, 196 (1998) (outlining ASEAN's implications for security among
member-states); Sheldon Simon, ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy
PAC.

Road to Community, 30 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 264, 268-69 (2008) (outlining both intra-

member and regional security tensions which served to rationalize ASEAN).
7. The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Aug. 8, 1967 (last visited
July 25, 2012), available at http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm.
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The focus on economic development among member-states was
directly linked to the Association's security concerns.8 From the
perspective of the founding nations, economic development and
prosperity would undermine the fomenting communist insurgencies within their borders, a priority given the fact that very hot
wars with communists were engulfing North and South Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia. 9 Thailand in particular perceived itself as a
frontline state against Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and Laos,
and was also facing a domestic communist insurgency.10 Both
the Philippines" and Malaysia12 were also experiencing sizable
threats from armed communist movements.
When it became increasingly clear that the United States
would extract itself from the region in the waning years of the
Vietnam War, the need to address both security and development within ASEAN became more pronounced. In 1969,
ASEAN commissioned a United Nations study to recommend a
regional economic cooperation and development strategy. The
study-called the Kansu report after its lead author Professor G.
Kansu of Turkey-was released in 1972 and published in 1974.13
The Kansu report recommended the adoption of regional trade
liberalization and import-substituting industrialization in the region.14 Within the context of ASEAN's early regional economic
8. See AMITAv ACHARYA, CONSTRUCIING A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN AND THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ORDER 55-77 (2001)
(providing an overview of the regional security context that drove the formation of
the ASEAN in Southeast Asia).
9. See Shaun Narine, ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security, 71
PAC. AFF. 195, 196 (1998) (noting that economic development in ASEAN would
undermine domestic communist insurgencies among member-states).
10.

See DAVID WYAT,

THAILAND: A SHORT HISTORY 287-90 (1982) (discuss-

ing Thailand's involvement in the Indochina War and communist movements within
the country).

11. See generally Justus van der Kroef, Communism and Reform in the Philippines, 46 PAC. AFF. 29, 29-58 (1973) (providing an overview of communist movements in the Philippines).

12. See generally Karl Hack, The Long March to Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand, in THAI SOUTH AND MALAY NORTH 173, 173-83
(Michael Montesana & Patrick Jory ed., 2008) (providing an overview of the Malay
Communist Party and its strategies along the Malay/Thai border); M. Ladd Thomas,
The Malayan Communist Insurgency, 4 ASIAN AFF. 306, 306-316 (1977) (outlining
history of the Communist Party of Malaysia and its activities in both Malaysia and
Southern Thailand during the Cold War).
13. See DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR, INDONESIA IN ASEAN: FOREIGN POLICY AND
REGIONALISM 65 (1994) (outlining the background of the Kansu report).

14. See Stuart Drummond, ASEAN: The Growth of an Economic Dimension,
35 THE WORLD TODAY 31, 32-33 (1979) (describing the basic components of the
Kansu report); Hal Hill & Jayant Menon, ASEAN Economic Integration: Driven by
Markets, Bureaucrats or Both? 4 (Australian Nat'l University, Working Papers in
Trade and Development, Paper No. 2010/11. 2010) (stating that the Kansu report
"proposed trade liberalization through selective, or product-by-product tariff negoti-
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cooperation initiatives, the report's recommendations for cooperative industrial policies and trade liberalization was an early
iteration of thinking towards an ASEAN Free Trade Area.15
Yet, in a pattern that would continue to hold sway throughout the 1970s, much of the economic growth among ASEAN nations resulted from policies enacted by individual member-states.
Indonesia began implementing a series of state-directed five year
development plans which led to an average growth of nearly 8%
per year from 1968-1981.16 Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand
enacted policies moving away from import-substituting industrialization and towards export-oriented industrialization, capitalizing on comparative advantages in labor costs and geographic
proximity to international sea lanes.' 7 Member-states also leveraged natural resources to enhance their economic productivity.
Thailand implemented infrastructure development plans which
greatly enhanced its abilities to produce and export cash crops
such as pineapples or sugar cane as well as manufactured
goods.18 Indonesian agricultural development strategies to subsidize the use of high-yield rice varieties and fertilizer saw a 32%
increase in rice yields in the 1970s.19
ASEAN continued a path towards greater regional cooperation in economic activities when it convened its first summit of
leaders in 1976-the Bali Summit. The meeting reflected a conscious willingness to strengthen ties in the face of communist
governance in a reunified Vietnam, a similar takeover in Laos,
and the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.20 Member-states at
ations, package deal arrangements for large industrial projects, and financial
cooperation").
15. See Teofilo C. Daquila & Le Huu Huy, Singapore and ASEAN in the Global
Economy: The Case of Free Trade Agreements, 43 AsAN SURV. 908, 921-922 (2003)
(discussing the Kansu report and early ASEAN moves towards regional economic
initiatives and AFTA).
16. See Siang Ng, Indonesia, in ASEAN

BUSINEss TRADE

& DiEviELOPMENr 54,

56-58 (Ron Edwards & Michael Skully ed., 1996) (outlining the history of economic
development in Indonesia following the inception of ASEAN).
17. See GERALD TAN, ASEAN EcoNoMic Diva.orPMENT AND CO-OPERATION

80-85 (1996) (outlining the adaption of export-oriented industrial strategies in
ASEAN nations). See also DAVID ANTHONY HouINaSwoOI,
TinL RisiE, TE
FALL, AND HiE RucovEav oir SournIEAsT AsIA'S MiNIDRAGoNs 6-7 (2007) (dis-

cussing policy shifts towards export-oriented industrialization).
18. See Julie Edwards, Thailand, in ASEAN Bus. TRAnE & Diev. 155, 160-61
(Ron Edwards & Michael Skully ed., 1996) (discussing Thailand's early government
development plans and its growth implications).
19. See GE.RAWo TAN, ASEAN ECONOMic DEvLorMENT AND Co-oPERMAnoN
53-54 (1996) (outlining Indonesian performance in rice yields as a result of government policies).
20. See Lay Hong Tan, Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a
Free Trade Area? 53 IrN'i. & Comi'. L. Q. 935, 935-36 (2004) (noting the prelude to
the first ASEAN Summit of leaders in Bali and the regional security context).
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the Summit signed the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, and the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, broad frameworks which recognized the organization's original principles and restated objectives to cooperate along political, economic, and cultural lines. 21
The Summit also saw the adoption of a program of action to increase regional economic cooperation based upon the Kansu report.2 2 A series of preferential tariff schemes and joint industrial
ventures were implemented regionally by ASEAN shortly

thereafter. 23
Growth strategies based on export-oriented industrialization
became the primary means of development for the ASEAN nations, supported by deregulation and policies which promoted direct investment from foreign corporations. 24 The success of
Southeast Asia as a manufacturing base was clearly related to
Japan's economic ascension in particular. Export-oriented Japanese firms moved manufacturing bases to Southeast Asia due to
regional proximity, cheap labor costs, and openness to foreign
investment. 2 5 Within this regional division of labor, Japan-at
the center of East Asia's economy-both produced the most advanced products and financed the capital for neighboring nations' exports. In turn, the "Newly Industrialized Countries"
(NICs) of East Asia (Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan) pro21. See Rodolfo Severino, ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration, 29 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 406, 409 (2007) (outlining products of the
Bali Summit and noting that the agreements "laid down the basic norms for interstate relations in the region").
22. See GERALD TAN, ASEAN ECONOmic DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION
10 (1996) ("Of these, perhaps the most important was the programme of action to
implement the recommendations of the United Nations team of experts, which, in
their 1972 report, urged the establishment of preferential trading arrangements as a
means of increasing intra-regional trade.").
23. See Lay Hong Tan, Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a
Free Trade Area? 53 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 935, 936-38 (2004) (outlining the implementation of the ASEAN Industrial Projects Scheme, ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme, and Preferential Trading Arrangements).
24. See DAVID ANTHONY HOLLINGSWORT-H, THE RISE, THE FALL, AND TIE RECOVERY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA'S MINIDRAGONs 6-8 (2007) (discussing the importance

to Southeast Asian economies of export-oriented manufacturing and foreign direct
investment). See also GERALD TAN, ASEAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION 80-81 (1996) (discussing the adoption of export-oriented manufacturing
strategies by ASEAN nations and deregulation policies).
25. See Ron Edwards & Kevin Wong, Regional Co-operation:ASEAN, AFTA
and APEC, in ASEAN Bus. TRADE & DEV. 1, 2 (Ron Edwards & Michael Skully
ed., 1996) (discussing the link between Japanese investment and ASEAN economic
growth in export-oriented manufacturing). See also DAVID ANTHONY HOLLINGSwORTH,

THE RISE, THE

FALL, AND

THE

RECOVERY

OF SOUTHEAST

ASIA'S

MINIDRAGONs 8 (2007) (noting the importance of foreign direct investment to the

Southeast Asian economies); Hal Hill, ASEAN Economic Development: An Analytical Survey-The State of the Field, 53 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 832, 840-42 (1994) (discussing the role of foreign direct investment in ASEAN manufacturing and
industrialization).
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duced skilled-labor intensive products, and-at the peripherythe Southeast Asian nations produced labor-intensive products.2 6
The average annual percentage rate of real gross domestic product growth from 1978-1987 for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, respectively, was 5.2%, 5.5%, and 6.4%, compared to only
4.5% for all developing nations in that same time frame. 27 From
1988-1995, those average annual growth rates only increased, respectively, to 7.9%, 8.9%, and 9.9% for those three ASEAN
nations. 28
Economic development in ASEAN remains a priority for
the foreseeable future. 29 In 1992, the original six ASEAN nations declared the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(A-FTA). 30 Under the AFTA agreement, member-states will
gradually reduce all tariffs from qualified manufactured goods
produced within ASEAN to rates of 0-5%.3 The agreement
stipulated a pre-determined schedule for tariffs of qualifying
goods to be reduced to target dates within a fifteen-year time
frame. 32 AFTA's creation reflected a desire among regional
elites to further liberalize trade internally, 33 while maintaining a
focus on external, export-driven trade, and to aggregate its market resources in the face of other regional economic communi26. See Paul Bowles, ASEAN, AFTA and the "New Regionalism", 70 PAC. AFF.

219, 222-23 (1997) (outlining the "flying geese" pattern of development used to describe East Asian regional patterns of direct investment and export-oriented manufacturing). See also Rajah Rasiah, Manufacturing export growth in Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand, in SOUTIHEAsr ASIAN PAPER TIGERS? FROM MIRACI E TO
DEIACLE AND BEYOND 19, 41-45 (Jomo K.S. ed., 2003) (discussing the confluence
of foreign direct investment and state-directed policies to promote export-oriented
manufacturing strategies in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand).
27. See Martin Hart-Landsberg & Paul Burkett, Contradictionsof Capitalist In-

dustrializationin East Asia: A Critique of "Flying Geese" Theories of Development,
74 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 87, 89 tbl. 1 (1998) (citing International Monetary Fund statistics on comparative GDP growth).
28. Id.
29. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, Bridging Development Gaps in Southeast
Asia: Towards an ASEAN Community 37-38 (UNISCI Discussion Papers, Paper No.
11, 2006) (outlining ASEAN initiatives to obtain regional cooperation and economic
integration among members states).
30. See Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Jan. 28, 1992 (last visited July 25, 2012),
available at http://www.aseansec.org/5124.htm.
31. See id. at art. 2 11 1-7 (outlining provisions of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff scheme for member-states).
32. See Narongchai Akrasanee & David Stifel, The Political Economy of the
ASEAN Free Trade Area, in AFTA: THE WAY AllEAD 27, 38-40 (Pearl Imada &
Seiji Naya ed., 1992) (discussing the preferential tariff schedule under the AFTA
agreement).
33. See Richard Stubbs, Signing on to Liberalization:AFTA and the Politics of
Regional Economic Cooperation, 13 Ti ii PAC. Rrv. 297, 298-300 (2000) (outlining
economic policy stances among elite decision makers in ASEAN member-states that
were related to the formation of AFTA).
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ties. 34 The 1997 financial crisis, which first struck in Thailand and
quickly spread to neighboring nations,35 revealed a number of
structural vulnerabilities behind ASEAN's high growth levels.
The most notable factors associated with the crisis included inadequate financial regulation, 36 and excessive lending followed by
rapid outflows of finance from foreign institutional investors. 37
Yet despite the significant financial, economic, and social impact
that immediately followed the crisis, in December of 1998 the
ASEAN heads of state regrouped and reaffirmed an economic
development-centered platform called the ASEAN Vision 2020,
which sought to further accelerate economic cooperation and development among members and fully implement the AFTA objective.38 ASEAN has also continued to partner with other
Asian nations to create regional trading schemes, such as China,
Japan, and South Korea.39 The expansion of the regional block
to include the formerly excluded communist nations of Indochina
and Myanmar, have increased ASEAN's size to ten nations with
a combined population of over 580 million people. 40
34. See Seiji Naya & Pearl Imada, The Long and Winding Road Ahead for
AFTA, in AFTA: THE WAY AHEAD 53, 56-58 (Pearl Imada & Seiji Naya ed., 1992)
(discussing the creation of AFTA as a response to global trends or regional economic cooperation such as the European Community and North American Free
Trade Area); Paul Bowles, ASEAN, AFTA and the "New Regionalism", 70 PAC.
AFF. 219, 223-24 (noting concern among ASEAN policymakers that the region remain strong in the face of other regional economic groupings); Alfredo Robles, The
ASEAN Free TradeArea and the Constructionof a Southeast Asian Economic Community in East Asia, 12 ASIAN J. OF POL. Sci. 78, 91 (2004) (discussing the global
context in which ASEAN moved to develop the AFTA scheme).
35. See Takashi Shiraishi, Introduction: States, Markets and Societies after the
Asian Crisis,in AI-IR THnE CRISIS: HEGEMONY, TECHNOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
INSOUTHEAST ASIA 1, 1 (Siraishi Takashi & Patricio N. Abinales eds. 2005) (outlin-

ing the basic course of the 1997 Asian financial crisis).
36. See DAVID ANTHONY HOLLINGSWORTH, THE RISE, THE FALL, AND TIE RECOVERY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA'S MINIDRAGONS 12-18 (2007) (discussing regulatory

failures and moral hazard among investors and lenders that triggered the crisis);
Aseem Prakash, The East Asian Crisis and the Globalization Discourse, 8 REV. OF

INT'L POL. ECON. 119, 122-25 (2001) (discussing causes of the financial crisis, including rapid flows of capital, lack of oversight, and poorly made investments).
37. See Michael R. King, Who Triggered the Asian Financial Crisis? 8 REV. OF
INT'L POL. ECON. 438, 445-46 (2001) (asserting that the risky behavior of Japanese

lenders were a major factor behind the Asian financial crisis); Jeong Yeon Lee, Foreign Portfolio Investors and FinancialSector Stability in Asia, 47 ASIAN SURV. 850,

863-68 (2007) (analyzing the role of institutional investors and international banks in
capital outflows that triggered the financial crisis).
38. See Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN Vision 2020, ASEAN (Dec. 15, 1997) (last visited July 25, 2012), http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm.
39. See generally Richard Stubbs, ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?, 42 ASIAN SURV. 440, 440-455 (2002) (outlining the history of ASEAN

relationships and trade agreements with other powerful Asian economies).
40. See ASEAN Secretariat, Fourth ASEAN State of the Environment Report
2009, Executive Summary, at 7 ASEAN (Oct. 2009) (providing an overview of
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In 2003, the ten ASEAN member-states re-affirmed the
ASEAN Vision 2020 and declared the creation of an ASEAN
Community by 2020, resting on "three pillars, namely political
and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and
shared prosperity in the region." 4 1 The Community will consist
of a single market and production base with the free flow of
goods, services, investment, capital, and skilled labor42 - an integrated economy that could compete against China and India. 4 3
Currently, three ASEAN nations are in the top forty largest
world economies by gross domestic product: Indonesia, Thailand,
and Malaysia. 4 4 Altogether, ASEAN's gross domestic product is
1,496,341 million US dollars, 4 5 making it the ninth largest economy in the world according to World Bank statistics.
ASEAN's economic expansion has led to considerable
socio-economic progress in many sectors. The combination of
high GDP growth, high rates of foreign investment, and high domestic savings rates46 has set the foundation for a human development revolution. 47 Considerable state resources have been
directed towards education, health, and poverty reduction
throughout the member-states. From 1970 to 1984/85, poverty
incidence in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, decreased respec"ASEAN facts and figures") (last visited July 25, 2012), www.aseansec.org/
publications/SoER4-Sum.pdf.
41. Declarationof ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord 1!), ASEAN (Oct. 7,2003)
(last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm.
42. See ASEAN Secretariat, Roadmapfor an ASEAN Community 2009-2015, at
22-30, ASEAN (Apr. 2009) (outlining the fundamental principles of the ASEAN Economic Community) (last visited July 25, 2012), www.aseansec.org/publications/
RoadmapASEANCommunity.pdf.
43. See DAVID AN-HONY Hoii-iNuGSWORTII, TIHE RisE-, THE FALL, AND TE REASIA'S MINIDRAGONs 194-97 (2007) (discussing the creacovEv or SOunHEAsA'
tion of the ASEAN Community as a response to the growing power of China and
India);

MICHAEL

R.J.

VATIKIOTIS, POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUrIIiAsT ASIA:

TRIM-

TREEn 184-87 (1996) (discussing the dynamics of the ChinaSoutheast Asia relationship).
44. See Gross Domestic Product 2010, WOmoo BANK (July 1, 2011) (last visited
July 25, 2012), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICSl
Resources/GDP.pdf.
45. See Selected Basic ASEAN Indicators, ASEAN (Feb. 15, 2011) (last visited
July 25, 2012), available at http://www.aseansec.org/statffablel.pdf.
MING TiiE BANYAN

46. See GuRAiio TAN, ASEAN ECONOMic DEvELoPMENT AND CO-OPERATION

29-30 (1996) (discussing high savings and investment ratios of ASEAN nations).
47. See Richard J. Estes, Social Development Trends in Asia, 1970-1994: "The
Challenges of a New Century", 37 Soc. INotCAoRs Riis. 119, 137-38 (1996) (discussing the high performance of Southeast Asia in social development indicators in relation to other Asian sub-regions).
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tively from 57%, 52%, and 39% to 22%, 21%, and 30%.48 There
have been profound advances in adult literacy rates49 and high
rates of enrollment in secondary education.50 Higher education
enrollment increased thirteen times in the region since 1960.51
Educational access for girls and women has amounted to much
greater labor force participation in ASEAN economies. 52 The
number of persons per physician decreased in almost all ASEAN
nations from 1975-1990 with the exception of the Philippines. 53
There have been corresponding increases in life expectancy
throughout the region, 54 and decreases of at least 50% in regional infant mortality rates.55
Numerous commentators also have pointed to unfavorable
aspects within Southeast Asia's development experience. The
gist of this criticism is that accelerated economic growth has led
to profoundly damaging socio-economic trends. 56 Critics have
asserted that economic growth in the region has been socially uneven or inequitable,57 driven the creation of overcrowded and
poorly managed urban megalopolises,58 undermined indigenous
48. See Jomo K.S., Growth with equity in East Asia?, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN PA-

BEYOND 196, 198 (Jomo K.S. ed.,
2003) (summarizing historical poverty incidence rates for various high performing
Asian economies from 1970 to 1993).
49. See Mohan Singh, Whither ASEAN? Convergence and Divergence of the RePER TIGERS? FROM MIRACLE Tro DEBACLE AND

gion's Socioeconomic Dynamics, in DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGE: SOUTHEAST
ASIA IN TIE NEW MILLENNIUM 75, 78-80 (Wong Tai-Chee & Mohan Singh eds.

1999) (discussing adult literacy rates in ASEAN nations).
50. See id. at 81 (discussing secondary school enrollment rates in ASEAN
nations).
51. See Gavin Jones, The Role of Education in ASEAN Economic Growth: Past
and Future, in DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGE: SOUnHEAsT ASIA IN THE NEW MILENNIUM 215, 221-22 (Wong Tai-Chee & Mohan Singh eds. 1999) (discussing tertiary
enrollment rates in ASEAN nations and noting that "tertiary enrolments in Southeast Asia have increased 13-fold since 1960").
52. See GERALD TAN, ASEAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION
92-112 (1996) (outlining ASEAN member-states' experiences with the inclusion of
women in domestic labor forces).
53. See Singh, supra note 49, at 81-82 (discussing access to health-related issues
in ASEAN nations).
54. See id. at 84-85 (discussing life expectancy changes among ASEAN nations).
55. See GERALD TAN, ASEAN EcoNoMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION
45-46 (1996) (outlining changes in general social development indicators among
ASEAN nations).
56. See JONATH-AN RIGG, SOUTIEASr ASIA: THE HUMAN LANDSCAPE OF MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 23 (1997) (summarizing criticisms of rapid capitalist development in Southeast Asia).

57. See Jomo K.S., supra note 48, 198-216 (discussing income and wealth distri-

bution in East Asian nations as a result of development).
58. See GERALD TAN, ASEAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION
198-200 (1996) (outlining common development-related criticisms directed at
ASEAN nations).
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Asian values for rampant material consumerism,59 and spawned
a "race to the bottom" phenomenon in labor costs that has led to
sweatshops or other forms of labor abuses. 60 A related line of
criticism is that excessive development related pathologies that
have emerged in some Southeast Asian nations can be traced to
the influence of international financial institutions such as the
World Bank or IMIF. 6 1 In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial
crisis, the implementation of IMF policies aimed at liberalizing
certain sectors of the affected domestic markets furthered this
argument because of their perceived negative impacts. 62
The fast pace of development in Southeast Asia raises questions about its impact on the natural environment. Development
economists generally acknowledge that environmental degradation is an inevitable result of development and industrialization, 63 which can be particularly harmful in nations with less
regulatory or institutional capacity to manage it.64 In theory, environmental degradation is mitigated at later stages of development as regulatory frameworks strengthen with the support of
59. See Sulak Sivaraksa, Economic Aspects of Social and Environmental Violence from a Buddhist Perspective, 22 BuncmiIsT-CIIRISTIAN STuo. 47, 52-55 (2002)
(arguing that corporate-driven capitalism has led to human and spiritual destructive
effects).
60. See WALDEN BELLo, SIIEAN CUNNINGHAM & Li KIENG PoiI, A SIAMESE
TRAGEDY: DEVELOPMENT & DISINTEGRATION IN MODERN TIHAILANID 88-90 (1998)
(criticizing labor practices in Thailand).

61. See Ooi Giok-Ling, Trade and the Environment in Southeast Asia, in DiwieiNE-w MILLENNIUM 127, 133

OPMENr AND CIIAuHNCE: SourHAsT ASIA IN THE

(Wong Tai-Chee & Mohan Singh eds., 1999) (discussing the impact of World Bank
adjustment lending on the environment); James Petras & Tienchai Wongchaisuwan,

Free Markets, AIDS and Child Prostitution,28 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 440, 440 (1993)
(asserting that the World Bank's encouragement of the tourism sector in Thailand is
at least partially responsible for the existence of child prostitution in Thailand).
62. See LIM CHONG YAH, SOUTHEII3AsT ASIA: TiHE LONG ROAD AHEAD 318-21
(2001) (outlining IMF policies in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea following
the financial crisis); Nicola Bullard, Walden Bello & Kamal Mallhotra, Taming the
Tigers: The IMF and the Asian Crisis, 19 Timinuo) WoRiui Q. 505, 505-556 (1998) (criticizing IMF policies and their impact among Asian nations receiving IMF loans in
the wake of the Asian crisis).
63. See John M. Antle & Gregg Heidebrink, Environment and Development:
Theory and International Evidence, 43 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CIIANGii 603, 605
(1995) (outlining the environmental transition hypothesis and the existence of environmental degradation at early periods of economic development); Thomas M. Selden & Daqing Song, Environmental Quality and Development: Is There a Kuznets
Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?, 27 J. ENvT. ECON. & MGMT!. 147,147-48 (1994)
(noting a consensus in economic discourse about the generation of pollution in early
stages of economic development).
64. See Larry Karp, Sandeep Sacheti & Jinhua Zhao, Common Ground Between Free-Traders and Environmentalists,42 IN-r'i" ECON. Ri.v. 617, 617-18 (2001)

(discussing wide-held concerns about the impact of trade and development on the
environment).
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middle classes.65 Outside the formal regulatory arena, it is also
possible for communities to pursue forms of environmental protectionism, though that might be dependent on the existence of
accessibility to legal or political avenues, and media and civil society activity. 66 The fact that Southeast Asian nations in general
are still developing regulatory and civil society assets thus heightens the importance of the environmental question.
Environmental degradation is implicated by a number of
trends. The flight to urban areas for employment opportunities
has caused many of Southeast Asia's major cities to become
sprawling population centers with impoverished urban ghettos,
high air and water pollution rates, and formidable traffic congestion. 67 At peak commute times, the average speed of traffic in
Bangkok was once measured to be eight kilometers an hour. 68
Excessive lead intake levels in blood have been reported to cause
400 deaths a year in Bangkok. 69 Between 1975 and 1998, the
amount of pollution caused by auto emissions increased five
times in Indonesia and ten times in Thailand. 70 As ASEAN na-

65. See generally Hemamala Hettige, Muthukumara Mani & David Wheeler,
Industrial Pollution in Economic Development: The Environmental Kuznets Curve
Revisited, 62 J. DEV. ECON. 445, 445-47 (2000) (outlining the theory of an inverse
relationship between increasing wealth and pollution); Ram6n L6pez & Siddhartha
Mitra, Corruption, Pollution, and the Kuznets Environment Curve, 40 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 137, 137-38 (2000) (discussing the "inverted-U-shaped relationship
between pollution and per capita income" in studies of developing economies).
66. See Sheoli Pargal & David Wheeler, Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries:Evidence from Indonesia, 104 J. Poi. ECON. 1314, 1316
(1996) (discussing community capacities to address environmental concerns as a
function of "income, education, level of civic activity, legal or political recourse, media coverage, presence of a nongovernmental organization").
67. See Jim Glassman & Chris Sneddon, Chiang Mai and Khon Kaen as Growth
Poles: Regional Industrial Development in Thailand and its Implications for Urban
Sustainability,590 ANNA! s AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 93, 96-98 (2003) (outlining

the urban problems facing Bangkok as a result of rapid growth); Nuntavarn VichitVadakan, Nitaya Vajanapoom & Bart Ostro, The Public Health and Air Pollution in
Asia (PAPA) Project: Estimating the Mortality Effects of ParticulateMatter in Bangkok, Thailand, 116 ENvrI. HEALTHI PERSP. 1179, 1180-82 (2008) (showing a signifi-

cant association between mortality rates and excessive air pollution in Bangkok,
Thailand).
68. See Antonia Hussey, Rapid Industrializationin Thailand 1986-1991, 83 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 14, 23 (1993) (discussing traffic congestion in Bangkok and air

pollution).
69. See BELLO, CUNNINGHAM & Poti, supra note 60, at 120 (discussing air pol-

lution and blood lead level studies conducted in Thailand).
70. See GERAiLi) TAN, ASEAN EcONoMic DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION
199 (1996) ("Between 1975 and 1998, the amount of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and total suspended particulates in the air increased by ten times in Thailand,
eight times in the Philippines and five times in Indonesia, much faster than the
growth rate of GDP.").
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tions have moved towards export-driven industrialization,'7 the
presence of industrial estates which generate hazardous waste
has increased. 72 This has led to a heightened prevalence of harmful exposures to workers and communities at or near such heavy
industrial sites, such as the metal and chemical refining complex
of Map Ta Phut in Thailand.73 In Jakarta, city authorities determined that over 70% of the rivers are heavily polluted, with over
850 companies dumping waste in rivers without permission. 74
Deforestation caused by logging for hardwood timber or crop
cultivation has been profound throughout the region.75 In some
years, over 3% of the natural forest in ASEAN nations has been
lost to development. 76 Forest clearing has contributed to soil
erosion and aggregation of polluted runoff into rivers.77 Mismanagement and development of forest assets has also negatively impacted isolated indigenous peoples in areas such as
Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia, whose livelihoods were intertwined with the ecosystems.78

71. See generally Walden Bello, Trouble in Paradise:The Tension of Economic
Integrationin the Asia-Pacific, 10 WORLD Pot'Y J. 33, 33-39 (1993) (offering a critical commentary on the impact of rapid industrialization and development in Southeast Asia as a consequence of foreign direct investment).
72. See Hussey, supra note 68, at 24-25 (discussing increasing pollution and
rapid industrialization in Thailand).
73. See Marco Peluso E' AL., Malondialdehyde-Deoxyguanosine Adducts
Among Workers of a Thai Industrial Estate and Nearby Residents, 118 ENvIrL.
HE-AunI PE-RSP. 55, 56-59 (2010) (finding significantly higher levels of air pollution
exposure to workers and community members near the Map Ta Phut industrial estate in Rayong, Thailand).
74. See Jakarta Rivers Still Filthy, JAKARTA POST (last visited July 25, 2012),
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/14/jakarta-rivers-still-filthy.htm1.
75. See Edward B. Barbier, Economic Aspects of Tropical Deforestation in
Southeast Asia, 3 GIoniAL EcoLoGY & BIOGEOGRAPHIY LHTEERs 215, 219-224
(1993) (outlining causes of deforestation in Southeast Asian nations as a consequence of demand for timber or farmland). See generally PASUK PIIONGPAIClu1t,
SUNGsIDII PIRIYARANGSAN & NUALNOi TiRuERAr, GUNS, GiuRs, GAMnING,
GANJA 142-45 (1998) (discussing illegal logging activities in Cambodia and the involvement of the Khmer Rouge).
76. See GEIRAi-io TAN, ASEAN ECONomic DEvILOPMENT AND CO-ovPIIeATION

200 (1996) (outlining annual rates of forest depletion in ASEAN nations).
77. See Charunee Normita Thongtham, Monitoring the Mekong, 16 AMmo 362,
362-63 (1987) (discussing water pollution and water quality issues affecting the Mekong river); Karl J. Pelzer, Man's Role in Changing the Landscapeof Southeast Asia,
27 J. ASIAN Sruo. 269, 277 (1968) (noting the effects of deforestation on soil erosion
in Java).
78. See Giok-Ling, supra note 61, at 136 (discussing deforestation in Sabah and
Sarawak).
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ASEAN'S SOFT LAW FRAMEWORK FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

As a regional entity, ASEAN has conceptually linked environmental management and protection to its wider economic development aims. The ASEAN approach thus rejects the
environment versus development dichotomy by assuming that
greater economic development will contribute to environmental
sustainability and preservation. As stated in the 2009 ASEAN
State of the Environment Report:
Economic development is the key for achieving various social
and environmental goals. For instance, economic growth can
lead to improvement in health and education and can contribute to the increase in the people's standard of living. . .. The

improved standard of living can lead to better care for the environment through reduced reliance on natural resources and
increased awareness and capacity for environmental
protection. 79
This ASEAN view is informed by a recognition that poverty and
underdevelopment can lead to harmful environmental practices,
as well as the region's own histories and struggles with poverty.8 0
This is certainly not to say that ASEAN spurns the natural environment in favor of development. Rather, it is a recognition that
poverty is linked to harmful environmental practices such as
rapid deforestation, soil erosion or exhaustion, poor environmental education and stewardship generally, and absence in environmental regulation.8 ' Additionally, introducing market-oriented
factors that promote more efficient processing in natural resource-related sectors can both create value and lead to more
sustainable practices. 8 2 ASEAN nations recognize that a significant portion of their domestic and export economies depend on
natural resource sectors.8 3 The region's large tourism industry is
79. ASEAN Secretariat, supra note 40, at 10.
80. See Mark A. McDowell, Development and the Environment in ASEAN, 62
PAc. AFF-r. 307, 308-09 (1989) ("In fact, the environmental problems of underdevelopment, of poverty, are no less acute and are just as widespread as the
environmental problems caused by affluence.").
81. See id. (discussing the connection between poverty, development, and the
natural environment in Southeast Asia).
82. See Stephen Tyler & Liz Fajber, Land and Water Resource Management in
Asia, at 8 (January 2009) (discussing improved agriculture practices that promote
sustainability in Asian nations) (last visited July 25, 2012), www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/
asiabackground landwater.pdf.
83. See Giok-Ling, supra note 61, at 133 ("In Indonesia for example, over 40
percent of the gross domestic product and 50 percent of employment are derived
from primary industries attributable to the downstream processing of natural resources or tourism . . . .").
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also dependent on preservation of natural environments. 84 Thus,
ASEAN considers obtaining environmental sustainability a strategic objective of economic development.
ASEAN's current environmental governance framework
can be best described as a soft law approach.85 Its environmental
policy formulation process is derived from the Association's
wider decision-making culture, which is based on principles of
consensus among leaders and accommodating differences
through quiet diplomacy. 86 Unlike the European regional approach, ASEAN has not created a regional political body with
legally enforceable mandates, but instead opts to identify general
policy directions with voluntary national compliance among
members.87 This decision-making norm is sometimes referred to
as the "ASEAN way," and places an emphasis on informal, personal relationships between heads of state, and reaching consensus through avoidance of direct conflict.88 Group decisionmaking is typically regarded as occurring almost exclusively at
high-levels of diplomacy. 89 Non-interference in the domestic af84. See generally Glen T. Hvenegaard & Philip Dearden, Linking Ecotourism
and Biodiversity Conservation:A Case Study of Doi Inthanon National Park, Thailand, 19 SINGAPORE JOURNAL OF1TROPICAiL GEOGRAPHY 193, (1998) (outlining the
development of ecotourism in Northern Thailand); Amat Ramsa Yaman & Abdullah Mohd, Community-based Ecotourism: A New Propositionfor Sustainable Development and Environmental Conservation in Malaysia, 4 JOURNAL OF AiPiUEDo
SCIENCEs 583 (2004) (discussing the potential benefits of ecotourism projects in Malaysian communities).
85. See Koh Kheng Lian & Nicholas A. Robinson, Regional Environmental
Governance: Examining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Model, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GoviRNANCE: 01-r-oNs & OPPORTUNrIES
101, 101 -105 (Daniel C. Esty & Maria H. Ivanova eds., 2002) (outlining the ASEAN
approach to environmental governance); Yoichiro Usui, An Evolving Path of Re-

gionalism: The Construction of an EnvironmentalAcqui in the EEC and ASEAN, at
12-14, ASEAN (2006) (outlining the overall ASEAN environmental governance
framework) (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.ne.jp/asahi/usui/
yoichiro/Paper_2006_Crep.pdf.
86. See generally MICHAEL ANTOLIK, ASEAN AND Thn DIPLOMACY oP AcCOMMODATION 3-10 (1990) (describing the accommodationist and consensus-based

principles that drive inter-ASEAN diplomacy); Robin Ramcharan, ASEAN and
Non-Interference: A PrincipleMaintained, 22 CONTEMPORARY SournEAsI' AsIA 61
(2000) (discussing the history of ASEAN's diplomatic approach and recent challenges with integration of Burma, Cambodia, and Vietnam).
87. See Lian & Robinson, supra note 85, at 104 (outlining the principles of
ASEAN diplomacy).
88. See generally Paul Davidson, The ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in
ASEAN Economic Cooperation, 8 SINGAPORE Y.B. INT'L L. AND CONTIBU'rORS
165 (2004) (discussing the "ASEAN way" in the context of ASEAN's economic integration policies); Hiro Katsumata, Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in South-

east Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the "ASEAN Way," 25 CONTIEMP.
SOurInEAsT AsIA 104 (2003) (describing the development of the "ASEAN way" and
its continual relevance in diplomatic affairs among members).
89. See Marlene Ramirez, ASIADHRRA and ASEAN: A Case Study on the
Processof Civil Society Engagement with a Regional Intergovernmental Organization
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fairs of member-states is regarded as the foundation of the
ASEAN way. 90 The flexibility inherent in this approach facilitates consensus building among ten member-states with widely
varying governing approaches (e.g. communism in Vietnam, democracies in the Philippines and Indonesia), starkly different
levels of development (e.g. 2011 Gross National Income per capita in Laos - $880, versus in Singapore - $37,22091), recent histories of military conflict among member-states, and relatively poor
domestic human rights records. Refraining from confrontation
about domestic affairs preserves harmonious relationships
among the organization's member-states. Although norms of
non-interference have generally preserved good relations among
ASEAN states, there is a lack of meaningful regional dialogue
for improving human rights in the area. Additionally, this overall
diplomatic and decision-making milieu has left regional environmental governance largely devoid of strong enforcement mechanisms, despite regular pronouncements or declarations by
ASEAN leadership.
ASEAN's first formal introduction into regional environmental management was the 1977 ASEAN Sub-regional Environment Program (ASEP). 92 Under the ASEP-a program of
action drafted with the assistance of the United Nations-environmental priority areas were identified, and a series of initiatives led to preliminary activities such as the development of
impact assessments and strengthening of environmental monitoring capacities. 93 This was followed in 1981 by the initiation of
regular ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on the Environment, and
the adoption of the Manila Declaration on the ASEAN Environment to "ensure the protection of the ASEAN environment and
the sustainability of its natural resources so that it can sustain
2, paper presented at Forum International de Montreal (2008) (last visited July 25,
2012), available at http://www.fimcivilsociety.org/en/library/MRamirez2008.pdf (noting that ASEAN is primarily state-centric and has had a weak history of interacting
with non-governmental organizations).
90. See Ramcharan, supra note 86.
91.

WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVE:LOPMENT INDICATORS 2011 11-12 (2011) (last

visited July 25, 2012), available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicators. See also Lian & Robinson, supra note 85, at 104 ("Members agree on common measures, decide how to implement them, and contribute
according to their capabilities, acknowledging that ASEAN member states have
achieved different levels of development and therefore have different capacities for
action.").
92. See Giok-Ling, supra note 61, at 128-30 (describing ASEAN efforts in regional environmental management).
93. See Wakana Takahashi, Environmental Cooperation in Southeast Asia, in
REGIONAIJSU3REGIONAiL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN ASIA 31, 32 (February 2001) (describing activities undertaken by ASEAN member-states under the
ASEP).
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continued development with the aim of eradicating poverty and
attaining the highest possible quality of life for the people of the
ASEAN countries." 9 4 The Declaration mandated no specific actions but called for adoption of "policy guidelines" among member-states to foster environmental education and encourage
sustainability practices.9 5
The ASEP and Manila Declaration set a direction for
ASEAN. A number of additional declarations of consensus followed, but were similarly characterized by broad policy language
without enforcement capacities. The 1982 Bangkok Declaration
on the ASEAN Environment furthered support for cooperative
activities, particularly in developing environmental action plans,
increasing the use of environmental impact assessments, and integrating environmental planning in major development
projects. 96 The 1987 Jakarta Resolution on Sustainable Development called on member-states to "adopt the principle of sustainable development to guide and to serve as an integrating factor in
their common efforts." 9 7 Second and third ASEAN Sub-regional
Environment Programs were adopted, in 1983 and 1988 respectively, which continued furtherance of cooperative technical and
educational initiatives in the environment. 98 Additionally,
ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on the Environment continue to
occur every three years, and ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment meet on an annual basis to continue cooperative talks
and review operational performance of environmental management projects.9 9 Cooperative endeavors have been developed by
the ASEAN Working Groups on the environment. These are expert technical and policy units with responsibility for developing
capacity and furthering cooperation in specific environmental
sectors'0 0 which are regularly reviewed by the Senior Officials.
In its strategic ASEAN Vision 2020 declaration in 1997, ASEAN
continued to affirm a broad commitment to a "clean and green
ASEAN with fully established mechanisms for sustainable devel94. Manila Declaration on the ASEAN Environment 1(a), Apr. 30, 1981.
95. Id.
96. Bangkok Declaration on the ASEAN Environment (1)(i)-(vii), Nov. 29,
1984 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.asean.org/6079.htm.
97. Jakarta Resolution on Sustainable Development 1, Oct. 30, 1987.
98. See Takahashi,supra note 93, at 33-35 (describing the ASEP II and III programs for environmental cooperation).
99. See Usui, supra note 85, at 13-14 (describing the ministerial and senior official level meetings).
100. See generally ASEAN Working Groups, (Current Working Groups are established for Nature Conservation and Biodiversity, Coastal and Marine Environment, Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Environmentally Sustainable Cities,
Water Resources Management, Environmental Education, and Climate Change)
(last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.aseansec.org/8967.htm.
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opment to ensure the protection of the region's environment,"' 0 '
which was also reiterated in the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community, 2009-2015, an agreement which binds ASEAN members
to a framework for further political, economic, and social
integration.10 2
Despite the soft law approach which composes the bulk of
ASEAN's environmental governance corpus, hard law instruments do exist, but with clear limitations. One of ASEAN's few
treaty documents on the environment was developed in 1985, the
Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.103 The Agreement requires member-states to adopt national conservation strategies, 104 maintain "maximum genetic
diversity" in conservation of species and ecosystems, 05 protect
habitat of endangered species, 106 prevent environmental degradation generally, 07 and commit sufficient funds and resources to
implementing the Agreement.108 The treaty was viewed as being
particularly progressive in its scope and strength.109 However,
three ASEAN nations-Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore-have
101. Lumpur, supra note 38.
102. ASEAN, ROADMAP FOR AN ASEAN COMMUNITY, 81, (ASEAN Secreta-

riat, 2009) (noting the strategic objective of establishing a "clean and green
ASEAN" as part of its sustainable development program) (last visited July 25,
2012), available at http://www.asean.org/publications/RoadmapASEANCommunity.
pdf.
103. ASEAN, ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, July 9, 1985 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.aseansec.
org/1490.htm.
104. See id. at art. 1(1)-(2) ("To this end they shall develop national conservation
strategies, and shall co-ordinate such strategies within the framework of a conservation strategy for the Region").
105. See id. at art. 3(1) ("The Contracting Parties shall, wherever possible, maintain maximum genetic diversity by taking action aimed at ensuring the survival and
promoting the conservation of all species under their jurisdiction and control.").
106. See id. at art. 5(1) (a-d) ("Contracting Parties shall, wherever possible...
prohibit the taking of these species. . . protect habitat of those species.").
107. See id. at art. 10 ("The Contracting Parties, with a view to maintaining the
proper functioning of ecological processes, undertake, wherever possible, to prevent,
reduce and control degradation of the natural environment").
108. See id. at art. 17 (2) ("They shall endeavor to allocate sufficient funds to the
task necessary for the implementation of this Agreement, as well as sufficient qualified personnel with adequate enforcement powers").
109. Kheng Lian Koh, ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources, 1985: A Study in Environmental Governance, 3 (last visited July
25, 2012), http://www.earthlore.calclients/WPC/English/grfx/sessions/PDFs/session
3/Koh.pdf (discussing commentary about the Agreement); Simon S. C. Tay, Fires
and Haze in Southeast Asia, in CROSS-SECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS IN ENHANCING

HUMAN SECURITY 53, 58-59 (Pamela J. Noda ed. 2002) (discussing critical reception

of the Agreement and potential reasons for why it was not ratified by all memberstates) [hereinafter Tay].
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not ratified the treaty, and thus the Agreement has not been
activated.' 10
ASEAN's second environmental treaty instrument came
into being as a reaction to the region's 1997 haze catastrophe.
Emanating principally from Indonesia, excessive and poorly
managed clearing of forest for timber and palm oil production,
combined with El Niflo-related weather effects, led to uncontrolled fires covering an estimated four million hectares of forest."' Prolonged haze caused by the smoke spread to
neighboring nations. Air pollution indexes soared, leading to numerous respiratory illnesses and deaths. 112 Travel, agriculture,
tourism, and business were all significantly affected within the
area, leading to almost $10 billion in damages.11 3 ASEAN first
responded by developing its Regional Haze Action Plan' 1 4 in
1997, aimed at strengthening cooperation in prevention, monitoring, and fire suppression activities.115 In 2002, ASEAN developed the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze
Pollution-the first such regional, transboundary haze mitigation
treaty in the region and world.11 6 The Agreement codified many
of the Action Plan's components: it created a regional haze pollution control center,"' 7 mandated development of national legislation to stop unregulated burning,118 and formed a voluntary
110. Takahashi,supra note 93, at 35 (describing the Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and noting its lack of ratification by memberstates of ASEAN).
111. James Cotton, The "Haze" over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN
Mode of Regional Engagement, 72 PACIIc AFAIRS 331, 332-335 (1999) (discussing

the scope and causes of the 1997-98 haze disaster).
112. Simon S.C. Tay, Southeast Asian Forest Fires: Haze over ASEAN and International Environmental Law, 7 Review OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTIERNATIONAi ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 202, 202-203 (1998) (discussing the effects of the

haze on the region) [hereinafter S.C. Tay].
113. S. Robert Aiken, Runaway Fires, Smoke-Haze Pollution, and UnnaturalDisasters in Indonesia, 94 GEOGRAPHICAL Rvirw 55, 63-64 (2004) (outlining the nat-

ural and social effects of the 1997 haze crisis on the region).
114. Regional Haze Action Plan, December 1997 (last visited July 25, 2012),
http://www.aseansec.org/9059.htm.
115. Tay,supra note 109, at 60-61 (outlining the parameters and policy guidelines
of the Regional Haze Action Plan).
116. ASEAN, ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, June 10,
2002 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/
library/treaties/06/6-03/asean-transboundary-pollution.xml.
117. See id. at art. 5(1) ("The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary
Haze Pollution Control, hereinafter referred to as "the ASEAN Centre," is hereby
established for the purposes of facilitating co-operation and co-ordination among
the Parties.").
118. See id. at art. 9(a) ("Developing and implementing legislative and other regulatory measures, as well as programmes and strategies to promote zero burning
policy to deal with land and/or forest fires resulting in transboundary haze
pollution.").

254

PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:234

haze pollution control fund to finance implementation of the
Agreement's requirements.' 19 The treaty, unfortunately, lacks
internal mechanisms for dispute resolution, compliance, and punitive measures for transgressions.12 0 The major limitation to the
Agreement, however, is that it required ratification from only six
member-states to enter into force.121 Nine of the ten ASEAN
member-states have since ratified the Agreement,122 with the exception of Indonesia, the nation which historically has been the
principal country of origin for the haze-creating forest fires. Although Indonesia may ratify the instrument in the future,123 it is
unclear if there are sufficient enforcement mechanisms within
the Agreement itself or support among Indonesian policymakers
to effectively implement its obligations.124
ASEAN's soft law approach has succeeded in identifying a general consensus on environmental preservation, and recognizing
the importance of a common regional ecosystem to continued development-an impressive result for such a diverse association of
nations. It has also developed historical precedents for regular
discussions and cooperative endeavors on a regional level in line
with overall ASEAN activities. Additionally, the adoption of
hard law instruments such as the Haze Agreement indicate that
the Association is willing to move on a second track towards
strengthening its' environmental protection mechanisms.125
However, continued adherence to a policy consensus norm that
seeks voluntary member-state compliance with broad strategic
119. See id. at art. 20(1 - 4) ("A Fund is hereby established for the implementation of this Agreement.... The Parties shall, in accordance with the decisions of the
Conference of the Parties, make voluntary contributions to the Fund.").
120. See generally Alan Khee-Jin Tan, The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution: Prospects for Compliance and Effectiveness in PostSuharto Indonesia, 13 N.Y.U. ENvrTL. L.J. 647, 647 (2005) (discussing the Haze
Agreement and internal and external weaknesses that lead to non-compliance).
121. ASEAN, ASEAN Agreement on TransboundaryHaze Pollution, at art. 29,
June 10, 2002 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/english/
services/library/treaties/06/6-03/asean transboundary-pollution.xml ("This Agreement shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.").
122. ASEAN, ASEAN Haze Agreement Ratification Status (last visited July 25,
2012), http://haze.asean.org/hazeagreement/status.
123. Indonesian government seeks passage of ASEAN Haze Agreement, PrntSTAR.COM, (last visited July 25, 2012), http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?
articleld=650694&publicationSubCategoryld=200 ("Indonesia is the only Asean nation that has not yet ratified the pact, with the House stating in 2008 that it
threatened the country's sovereignty.").
124. S.C. Tay, supra note 112, at 203-204 (1998) (discussing the lack of enforcement of domestic Indonesian laws to prevent fire clearing).
125. See Takahashi,supra note 93, at 48-49 (discussing the potential implications
of the Transboundary Haze Agreement for ASEAN).
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objectives reveals clear weaknesses.126 Translating ASEAN's numerous declarations on regional environmental policy into national law enforced on a local level implicate institutional
capacities, domestic political will, and wider concerns over national sovereignty.
IV. THE ASEAN CHARTER AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
After over forty years of existence, ASEAN is now entering
a new era of governance with significant potential to elevate environmental and development concerns from a soft-law approach
into a rights-based framework. Two institutional developments
have precipitated this possibility: the ratification of the ASEAN
Charter in 2008,127 and the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights ("AICHR") in 2009128the Association's first human rights body. Both the Charter and
AICHR are milestones for ASEAN, and could serve to set the
parameters for strengthening human rights and environmental
protections within a rules-based community. There are, however, significant questions that remain unresolved. First, there is
the issue of what international environmental rights might be integrated into an ASEAN regimen. Second, and more important,
is whether ASEAN-given both these new institutional developments and its normative practices-is ready and willing to embrace a strong framework for environmental rights. The focus
here should be on the potential role of the AICHR as a forum
for protecting such rights. Co-equal in importance with the last
question posed is, if ASEAN is unable or unwilling to fully integrate such protections into a rights-framework, what path should
it take in regards to environmental rights?
Explicating a connection between environmental protection
and human rights reveals some important limitations, irrespective of forum. Clearly, environmental conditions impact human
well-being, and social justice initiatives meant to improve human
communities often have an environmental component. 129 Inter126. See Lian & Robinson, supra note 85, at 110-113 (discussing strengths and
weaknesses of the ASEAN approach to environmental governance).
127. ASEAN Charter, Preamble, Nov. 20,2007 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.asean.org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.
128. Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on
Human Rights, Oct. 23, 2009 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.
asean.org/documents/Declaration-AICHR.pdf [hereinafter Charter].
129. Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights Have Been Recognized? 35 DENVER J. IN'iL L. & PoL'Y 129, 169
(2006) ("The interrelationship between human rights and environmental protection
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national law developments recognize the link between human
well-being and the environment. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment recognized that "[m]an has the
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions
of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being." 130 The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development reaffirmed this connection, with its
opening principle stating that "[h]uman beings are at the centre
of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a
healthy and productive life in harmony with nature."1 31 Yet beyond soft declarations, incorporating environmental concerns
into a normative and binding rights-based paradigm has remained at least partially elusive. A distinct, universal, and
unalienable human right to a healthy natural environment has
not been recognized in any global human rights treaty. 132 The
principal problem is one of definition. Should there be a human
right to a healthy environment, or just to a "satisfactory" environment?133 Identifying the substantive parameters of a healthy
environment and accompanying environmental standards is a
highly subjective determination for international policy makers. 134 Enforcing such a right and developing the associated standards would prove complex and difficult, and likely more suited
to an administrative body with a legislative mandate, and not a
judicial one.135 With the exception of the 2002 Ogoniland ruling
is undeniable. Human rights depend upon environmental protection, and environmental protection depends upon the exercise of existing human rights such as the
right to information and the right to political participation").
130. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Principle 1, U.N. Doc. A/.CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972).
131. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Principle 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (June 14, 1992).
132. Shelton, supra note 129, at 166 ("At present no global human rights treaty
proclaims a general right to environment").
133. Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment 33 (last
visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file-download/
publications/0 1221 humanrightsorenvironmentalrightsareasses.pdf (High Level
Experts Meeting on the New Future of Human Rights and the Environment: Moving the Global Agenda Forward, Nairobi, Kenya November 2009, and noting differences in proposed and existing standards for an environmental human right).
134. Michael Burger, Bi-Polarand PolycentricApproaches to Human Rights and
the Environment, 28 COLUMBIA J. ENVTL. L. 371,381-82 (2003) ("What constitutes a

clean, healthy, satisfactory, decent, viable or ecologically sound environment is a
difficult question"); Boyle, supra note 133, at 12 (High Level Experts Meeting on
the New Future of Human Rights and the Environment: Moving the Global Agenda
Forward, Nairobi, Kenya November 2009, and asserting that an international right
to a healthy environment is "too uncertain a concept to be of normative value").
135. Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment:A Mildly
'Revisionist' View, in HUMAN RIGI-TS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 117, 13738 (Antonio Augusto Cangado Trindade ed. 1992) (discussing the appropriate forum
for consideration of environmental issues as rights).
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by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights,136
there are few examples of a recognized, distinct, and justiciable
international human right to a healthy environment derived from
a human rights instrument.
There are, however, instances of regional courts considering
human rights violations that arose as consequences of an act or
omission with an environmental nexus. However, these are cases
in which the alleged violations were of more traditional human
rights, and not a substantive human right to a healthy environment. Typical fact patterns in such cases are when the natural
environment becomes so degraded or damaged that it threatens
human health, and the alleged human rights violation, for instance, is a violation of a plaintiff's right to life, and not a violation of an individual's right to a satisfactory or healthy
environmental right.137 An example of such a case would be
Oneryildiz v. Turkey, 138 in which the European Court of Human
Rights found Turkey in violation of the European Convention's
Article 2 Right to Life following the deaths of several people living near a garbage dump after a methane gas explosion. A similar case was that of Ldpez Ostra v. Spain,13 9 in which the
European Court found Spain in violation of the Convention's
Article 8-the Right to private and family life-because industrial pollution from a waste treatment plan was interfering with
the plaintiff's overall well-being, who lived nearby the plant.140
These examples illustrate the argument that there may not need
to be a distinct human right to the environment when any purported acts or omissions that lead to actual human harm can be
adjudicated as violations of already existing human rights. 141
Although a substantive human right to a satisfactory or
healthy environment remains evasive in the international human
rights canon, there are recognized procedural rights to environmental information and participation in policy matters. These
136. Dinah Shelton, Decision Regarding Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic Rights Action Center/Center
for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria). Case No. A CHPRICOMM/A044/1, 96
AM. J. I'INT'L L. 937, 937 (2002).
137. See Boyle, supra note 133, at 1 (discussing the anthropocentric nature of
human rights and traditional approaches to human rights violations).
138. Oneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004).
139. L6pez Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994).
140. For an overview of European Court of Human Rights cases regarding the
environment, see generally Ole Pedersen, European Environmental Human Rights
and Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming, 21 GEo. INT't ENVrL. L. Riv. 73
(2008).
141. Boyle, supra note 137, at 30 (discussing European Convention on Human
Rights case law and asserting that it "clearly demonstrates how much environmental
protection can be extracted from existing human rights law without creating specifically environmental rights").
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procedural rights are codified in the 1998 Convention on Access
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, otherwise known as the
Aarhus Convention. 142 The Aarhus Convention-whose signatories include forty-four mainly European nations including the
European Union 143 - clearly recognizes three distinct types of
procedural rights for persons in environmental decision-making:
a right of access to information, a right to public participation in
decision-making, and a right of access to justice in environmental
matters. 144 The right to information requires state parties to provide information about the environment if requested from the
public,145 subject to certain exemptions, and immediate dissemination of information if imminent human or environmental harm
is possible. 146 The right to participation requires state parties to
provide opportunities for fair and transparent public participation in decision-making regarding plans and programs related to
the environment. 147 Finally, the right of access to justice mandates the guarantee of judicial review procedures for individuals
to challenge decisions.148 The Convention's provisions are by no
means radical. The Rio Declaration's Principle 10149 recognized
that "[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with participation
of all concerned citizens"150 and called on states to provide "the
142. Convention on Access to Information, Public Information in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S.
447 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
143. See Status of Ratification for Aarhus Convention UNECE, (last visited July
25, 2012), http://live.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.html.
144. Aarhus Convention, supra note 142, art. 1 (stating as its objective the guaranteeing of rights to information, participation, and justice).
145. Id. art. 4.
146. Id. art. 5, 1(c). The Aarhus Convention's recognition of informational
rights draws from now common transparency-related regimens that exist in a number of developed nations' law or rule-making processes. For instance, informational
rights in administrative procedures were first established in the United States
through the Freedom of Information Act in 1966. See Freedom of Information Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966). Similar legislation followed in other common law and European nations, before its recognition in both soft and hard international environmental law through the Rio Declaration and Aarhus Convention. See
Peter H. Sand, The Right to Know: EnvironmentalInformation Disclosure by Government and Industry, 2-3, paper delivered to the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change: Knowledge for the Sustainability Transition, Berlin, Institute
of International Law, University of Munich, (Dec. 2002) (discussing the history and
development of informational rights).
147. Aarhus Convention, supra note 142, art. 7.
148. Id. art. 9.
149. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Principle 1 (June 14, 1992),U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992).
150. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Principle 10 (June 14, 1992),U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992).
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Principle 10 (June 14, 1992),U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992).
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opportunity to participate in decision-making processes . . . .
[and] facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation
by making information widely available." The general principle
that environmental decision-making should require public participation is well-entrenched as a legislative guarantee in many nations, including the United States, which has an extensive
modern history of requiring public involvement activities in federal environmental laws. 51
How might such procedural environmental processes be incorporated into ASEAN's new rights-based machinery? The
ASEAN Charter codified ASEAN's policymaking norms and established the AICHR. It thus provides an important context for
examining the challenges and possibilities of integrating procedural environmental rights into ASEAN's environmental governance framework. The Charter essentially serves as a
constitution-like text for the Association. 152 The Charter was
first proposed by Malaysia in 2004, and the initiative to develop
the Charter was adopted by ASEAN at its 2005 ASEAN Summit. 153 After nearly four decades of existence, the Charter codifies the prevailing normative framework of ASEAN relations
and practices into a binding document among member-states,
particularly the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs
and peaceful relations among states. 154 Many of the Charter's
principles reflect the various treaties, protocols, and declarations
generated by ASEAN over the years, alongside foundational
texts such as the original 1967 Bangkok Declaration and the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed at the 1976 Bali Summit. 155 The stated purposes of the Charter in Article 1 ("Purposes") are to continue ASEAN's original missions to maintain
peace and security in the region;156 promote greater political, economic, and social cooperation among members;' 57 create a sin151. See Benjamin W. Cramer, The Human Right to Information, the Environment and Information About the Environment: From the Universal Declarationto the
Aarhus Convention, 14 COMM. L. & Pol v 73, 90-91 (2009) (noting statutory requirements for public involvement in environmental matters in the United States).
152. Charter, supra note 127.
153. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, The ASEAN Charter:An Opportunity Missed
or One that Cannot Be Missed? SouTI-IAsr AsIAN A17., 2008, at 71, 71-72 (2008)
(outlining the birth and development of the ASEAN Charter).
154. See Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN at Forty: A Balance Sheet, Sou-r-eninAsT
AsIAN Ai-F., 2008, at 61, 61-65 (discussing the development of the Charter as a reflection of ASEAN practices).

155. See Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN's Constitutionalization of International
Law: Challenges to Evolution Under the New ASEAN Charter,49 Coi.um. J. TRANSNAT'i. L. 268, 282-288 (2011) (outlining the pre-Charter years of ASEAN and the
emergence of the Charter).
156. Charter, supra note 127, at art. 1, 11.

157. See id. at art. 1, f2.
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gular regional market of goods, services, and investment;158 and
further economic development and poverty reduction. 159
Yet in addition to codifying ASEAN's core principles, the
Charter serves as the textual foundation for a regional community based on principles of civil society and democracy. In its
development, non-governmental associations throughout the region participated in a series of dialogues about the Charter with
an official consultative body selected by member-state governments. 160 Upon its release, the Association declared that
"ASEAN is moving from being State-centric to be more peopleoriented. At least 10 of the 15 stated purposes of ASEAN in
Chapter I concern the livelihood and well-being of peoples in
ASEAN."1 61 Particular statements of interest in Article 1 reflecting this purported mission include the Charter's declared intent "to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and
the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms,"1 62 "to ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with the world at large in a
just, democratic and harmonious environment,"1 63 "to enhance
the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing them with equitable access to opportunities for human development, social welfare and justice,"1 64 and "to promote a
people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of
ASEAN integration and community building." 65 Additionally,
Article 2 of the Charter reaffirms ASEAN's "respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights,
and the promotion of social justice,"1 66 and recognizes its commitment to "the United Nations Charter and international law,
including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by
ASEAN Member States."167 This is particularly relevant because all ASEAN nations are parties to two major international
human rights treaties: the Convention on the Elimination of All
158. See id. at art. 1, 5.
159. See id. at art. 1, 2(i).
160. See Caballero-Anthony, supra note 153, at 71-75 (outlining civil society participation and expectations in the development of the ASEAN Charter).
161. Media Release: ASEAN Leaders Sign ASEAN Charter (last visited July 25,
2012), http://www.asean.org/21085.htm.
162. Charter, supra note 127, at art. 1, 7.
163. See id. at art. 1, $4.
164. See id. at art. 1, 11.
165. See id. at , art. 1, 13.
166. See id. at art. 2, 2(i).
167. See id. at art. 2, 2(j).
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Forms of Discrimination against Women ("CEDAW"),168 and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC").169
Because the Charter serves as a foundational text for the
Association and is a binding legal instrument among all members, there is reason for optimism in such declarations. But both
a holistic and contextual analysis of the Charter leaves room for
doubt. The principle concern is that the Charter codifies
ASEAN's longstanding practice of non-interference in the domestic activities of its member-states, a pattern of behavior that
has effectively allowed member-states to engage in a variety of
practices deemed antithetical to democratic norms and human
rights. 70
ASEAN has long been criticized as a regime that has generally disregarded human rights violations because of its adherence
to principles of non-interference.17 1 Although Myanmar is
widely acknowledged as the most notorious state perpetrator of
human rights violations,172 criticism is due for almost all members of ASEAN. In recent years, high profile criticism has resonated internationally regarding Thailand's crackdown of street
168. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. For a list of nations party to the Convention,
see ratification/accession/succession list availableat http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en.
169. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. For
a list of nations party to the Convention, see 8. Convention on the Elimination ofAll
Forms of Discrimination against Women, UNEIED NATIONS TRFATY COLIUi.ICrIONS.
170. See Severino, supra note 154, at 64-65 (discussing the lack of clarity as to
whether the Charter's ideals will be realized in actual behavior among memberstates). See also Yuval Ginbar, Human Rights in ASEAN: Setting Sail or Treading
Water? 10 Hum. R-rs. L. Rinv. 504, 513 (2010) (discussing the overall language of the
Charter and noting that "[tihe one 'principle' referring to human rights ... is flanked
by three others emphasising [sic] 'independence, sovereignty . . . non-interference in
. . . internal affairs' and 'respect for the right of every Member State to lead its
[national] existence free from external interference ... '").
171. See generally Lee Jones, ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference in
Southeast Asia: A Quest for Social Order 2-5 (Nuffield College Politics Group,
Working Paper, March 2009) (discussing the practice of non-interference in ASEAN
and its overall implications); Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN
Countries: 'Promises to Keep and Miles to go Before I Sleep,' 2 YAuE HuM. R-rs. &
Dev. L. J. I (discussing the overall human rights situation in ASEAN nations).
172. See generally John Arendshorst, The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human Rights, and the ASEAN Charter, 8 Nw. J. INun.. HUM. R-rs. 102
(2009) (discussing Myanmar's history of human rights violations and the lack of
strong ASEAN response); Mann Bunyanunda, Burma, ASEAN, and Human Rights:
The Decade of Constructive Engagement, 1991-2001, 2 STAN. J. EAs-r AsIAN AFF.

118 (2002) (discussing ASEAN relations with Myanmar and human rights); Michael
Ewing-Chow, First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions and Human Rights, 5
Nw. J. INTL. Hum. R-rs. 153 (2007) (discussing the international response to My-

anmar's history of human rights violations).
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protesters in 2010,173 accounts of state torture and impunity related to the Muslim insurgency in its southern provinces, 174 and
the ongoing Anwar debacle in Malaysia's courts.175 Lesser
known but equally egregious violations of human rights have
long occurred in other ASEAN nations, including Laos' treatment of the Hmong and other minorities,17 6 and the repression of
Christians in Vietnam.177 Non-interference effectively shields all
members of ASEAN from the deserved criticism that is due.
The Charter's principles state that member-states shall have
"respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial
integrity and national identity"178 of other Association members,
and "non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member
States."179 Additionally, the ASEAN Summits-the periodic
meetings among Association heads of state-are recognized as
the supreme decision making body for ASEAN, 1s0 and the principal mode of decision making being "consultation and consensus"1 81 among members. This structure has created significant
concern because it is unclear how heads of state would resolve
difficult issues regarding member-states' behavior. Informal
"consultation and consensus" among heads of state and the lack
of any specifically defined enforcement mechanism for Charter
principles are inadequate mechanisms for protecting human
rights. 182 Historically, ASEAN heads of state have strictly adhered to principles of non-interference in the activities of member-states.183 Indeed, when the Charter was adopted in 2007, one
173. See Seth Mydans, Rights Group Urges Prosecutions in Thai Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2011, at A16 (discussing the violent crackdown of pro-Thaksin
Shinawatra street protesters who occupied central Bangkok in 2010).
174. See Thomas Fuller, Southern Thailand's Turmoil Grows, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
5, 2009, at A4 (discussing the violent insurgency in Thailand's southern provinces
and purported human rights violations by state security forces).
175. See Liz Gooch, As Clinton Visits, Malaysia Promises Fair Trialfor Dissident,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A12 (discussing the treatment of Malaysian opposition
figure Anwar Ibrahim).
176. Laos: Cease Arbitrary Detention of Deported Hmong, HUMAN RIGHTS

WATCH, (last visited July 25, 2012) availableat http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/10/28/
laos-cease-arbitrary-detention-deported-hmong (discussing treatment by Laotian
authorities of deported Hmong refugees).
177. See Seth Mydans, Vietnam Persecutes Christian Minority, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES, April 1, 2011, at All (discussing the situation of Christian minorities in the
central highlands of Vietnam).
178. Charter, supra note 127, at art. 2, 2(a).
179. See id. at art. 2, 2(e).
180. See id. at art. 7, 2(a).
181. See id. at art. 20, 1.
182. Caballero-Anthony, supra note 153, at 77-80 (discussing how the lack of an
appropriate enforcement mechanism undermines the Charter's declarations).
183. See Desierto,supra note 155, at 286-287 ("Noting that in over forty years as
a regional cooperation, ASEAN has stood by this principle of non-interference by
refraining from openly criticizing Member States' human rights records, refusing
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of its member-states, Myanmar-arguably the worst state violator of human rights in the region-engaged in a brutal crackdown of peaceful popular protests led largely by Buddhist
monks. 84 Like the other member-states, Myanmar's military
government was a signatory to the Charter. 85
In addition to the discord between those sections of the
Charter that declare a commitment to democracy and human
rights, and the continued norm of non-interference in domestic
activities of member-states, the Charter's creation of the
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
("AICHR") has generated considerable attention and scrutiny.
The AICHR was created by Article 14 of the Charter, which simply called for the creation of a human rights body which would
operate in accordance with parameters to be determined at a
later date.186 The lead-up to the creation of the AICHR was
characterized with a great amount of anticipation, particularly by
international and regional human rights advocates and civil society organizations.1 87 The body's formal Terms of Reference were
adopted by ASEAN in 2009, and the AICHR was formally
presented as "the overarching institution responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights in ASEAN." 88
Similar to the ASEAN Charter, the AICHR's Terms of Reference contain incongruous language which creates disparate understandings of the commission's parameters, much of it derived
literally from Charter clauses. The stated purposes of the commission are to "promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples of ASEAN,"'189 "uphold the
rights of the peoples of ASEAN to live in peace, dignity and
prosperity,"'9 and promote the "well-being, livelihood, welfare
and participation of ASEAN peoples in the ASEAN Community
support to any opposition movements, insisting on consensus voting and resorting to
informal (and often privately brokered) settlement of differences at the ministerial
level").
184. See Caballero-Anthony, supra note 153, at 75 (discussing Myanmar's sharp
and violent repression of protest but continued participation in the 2007 Summit).
185. Charter, supra note 127, at art. 39 (containing signature of General Thein
Sein, Prime Minister of the Union of Myanmar).
186. See id. art. 14, $11-2.
187. See Catherine Drummond, The ASEAN IntergovernmentalCommission on
Human Rights (AICHR) and the Responsibility to Protect: Development and Potential 11-23 (Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Working Paper on
ASEAN and R2P No. 1, Nov. 2010) (discussing momentum towards stronger human
rights initiatives in Southeast Asia generally and anticipation of the AICHR).
188. Charter, supra note 128.
189. ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, Terms of Reference, 11.1 [hereinafter AICHR, Terms of Reference].
190. Id. 11.2.
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building process."191 However, its human rights mission should
occur "within the regional context, bearing in mind national and
regional particularities and mutual respect for different historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, and taking into account
the balance between rights and responsibilities." 19 2 Additionally,
the AICHR "shall be guided by ... respect for the independence,
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of
all ASEAN Member States; non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States; [and] respect for the right of
every Member State to lead its national existence free from external interference."1 93 The conditioning of the commission's
mission on these principles suggest that ASEAN norms of noninterference in domestic activities will constrain any role it may
have in terms of enforcing compliance among members. The
AICHR's perceived adherence to the norm of non-interference
thus spoiled the immediate hopes of regional civil society activists who hoped it would serve as a marked departure from
ASEAN's troubled history of human rights violations.194 Additionally, the commission's members are composed entirely of officially appointed representatives from the governments of
member-states, 195 as opposed to civil society representatives or
individuals who would retain impartial independence from member governments. This heightens the sense that the commission
might lack the teeth that are arguably necessary for a strong and
independent human rights mechanism.
A. THE AICHR AS A HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION ENTITY
Taken together, both the ASEAN Charter and the AICHR's
Terms of Reference appear to bifurcate the commission's mandate into two distinct lines, as expressly reflected in its opening
statement of purpose to "promote and protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms of the peoples of ASEAN."1 96 Arguably,
the AICHR's mission to protect human rights serves as its more
important function, and is thus more important than its promotional mandate. A protection and enforcement role for the
AICHR would comport with expectations that it develop into a
191. Id. 1.3.
192. Id. 11.4.
193. Id. 92-2.1(a)(b)(c).
194. See Ginbar, supra note 170, at 504-18 (outlining the AICHR and overall
context of human rights in ASEAN, its reception, and potential for further evolution). See also Vitit Muntarbhorn, Towards an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism:
A Concept Paper, in TOWARDS AND ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM 6, 2022(discussing civil society visions for a Southeast Asian human rights mechanism as
stated in the 1993 Bangkok Nongovernmental Human Rights Declaration).
195.

AICHR, Terms of Reference supra note 189,

196. Id.

11.1.

95.
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regional human rights mechanism with independence, powers of
judicial review, and enforcement capabilities. One potential trajectory of evolution for the AICHR to pursue its protection mandate-and arguably the ideal scenario hoped for by regional
human rights activists-would be for it to develop into a human
rights regime akin to that in Europe: a strong regional court that
effectively acts as an appellate level judicial body to enforce a
regional human rights convention among all member-states.197
However, the commission's protection mandate rests on relatively weak textual support. At the outset, the very fact that the
body is a commission as opposed to a court with judicial review
powers supports the notion that the AICHR might amount to a
significantly weak body for protection of human rights. A major
problem is the lack of a binding instrument with substantive
rights. The commission is scheduled to draft and release an
ASEAN Human Rights Declarations98 that will not be a binding
document, but will later serve as the basis for a Convention that
ostensibly will have binding force among members. 199 Yet the
development of such an agreement into a strong instrument
seems fraught with a number of significant challenges. First, it is
unclear if a binding document for ASEAN would have the same
or similar substantive and procedural rights as, for example, the
European Convention for Human Rights does. Both explicit language in the AICHR Terms of Reference and long-standing normative practices of ASEAN indicate that it will likely pursue
development of any human rights instrument through a consensus approach 2 00 that will be "constructive and non-confronta197. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 ("The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention"); Id.
art. 32 ("The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto . . . ").
See also D.J. HARRIS FT AL., LAW OF Tim EUROrFAN CONVENTION 702 (1st. ed,

1995) (noting that compliance with the judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights by member-states "is generally recognised to be exemplary"); Heinrich
Klebes, Membership in International Organizations and National Constitutional
Law: A Case Study of the Law and Practice of the Council of Europe, S-I. LouisWARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 69, 78 (1999) (describing the history of the European
Convention and noting that of its approximately 800 or more judgments, "[a]ll its

decisions have been respected, though sometimes grudgingly, by the States
concerned").
198. AICHR, Terms of Reference supra note 189, $4.2.
199. See Desy Nurhayati, States Should be Responsible to Citizens, TIHE JAKARTA

Posr, (last visited July 25, 2012), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/07/20/
rights-declaration-states-should-be-responsible-citizens.html.
200. See AICHR, Terms or Reference, supra note 189, $6.1 ("Decision-making
in the AICHR shall be based on consultation and consensus in accordance with
Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter.").

266

PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:234

tional." 20 1 Given the domestic human rights records of
individual ASEAN nations such as Myanmar and others, it is difficult to imagine that a consensus-seeking process among member-states would allow for the development of a particularly
strong binding instrument.
One possibility is that the human rights declaration currently
being drafted-and any subsequent instrument based on itwould amount to an inadequate or insubstantial statement of
human rights norms purportedly based on "Asian values." 2 02
Such a development would comport with the "Asian values" narrative that was embraced and promoted by former Southeast
Asian heads of state such as Dr. Mahathir Mohamad 203 and Lee
Kuan Yew 204 to marginalize human rights criticism as a variant of
western domination. Another possibility is that ASEAN could
adopt an "ASEAN minus X" model to an instrument, allowing
for a multi-stage accession to a binding treaty in which, for example, some of the more democratically mature ASEAN nations
ratify the convention early, and other member-states such as
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, are given more time to
accede. 205 This type of framework has been used previously by
ASEAN in the adoption of various regulatory frameworks. 206

201. AICHR, Terms of Reference supra note 189, 2.4.
202. See Michelle Staggs Kelsall, The New ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: Toothless Tiger or Tentative FirstStep, (ANALYSIS FROM THE
EAST-WEsr CENTER), Sept. 2009, at 5-6 (last visited July 25, 2012), availableat http:/
/www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/api09O.pdf (discussing the "Asian
values" debate and its possible re-emergence vis-A-vis the AICHR). See also
Muntarbhorn, supra note 194, at 9-11 (discussing the history of human rights within
ASEAN and noting its inclination towards a regional, and not universal, conception
of human rights).
203. See Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of "Western" Universalism, in THE EAsT

ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN

RIGH-s 60, 70-71,

76 (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds. 1999) (noting examples of Mahathir's
defense of the "Asian values" narrative). See also KHOO Boo TEIK, PARADOXES OF
MAHATHIIRISM 65-74 (1995) (discussing Mahathir's "look east" philosophy and emulation of the economic development experiences of other East Asian nations).
204. See Fareed Zakaria, Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,
73 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 109, 113-14 (1994) (presenting Lee Kuan Yew's narrative on
differences between eastern and western values and societies).
205. Charter, supra note 127, at art. 21, 2.
206. See Caballero-Anthony, supra note 153, at 78-79 (discussing use of a staggered accession system to agreements by some but not all ASEAN member-states);
Muntarbhorn, supra note 194, at 28 ("A step-by-step approach may require that
those ASEAN countries which are ready to concretise an ASEAN human rights
instrument and related mechanism would do so, while leaving the others to join
later. This would be based upon the "X minus Y" approach already used by ASEAN
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However, that is unlikely as the ASEAN Charter seemingly limits such a flexible arrangement to economic agreements. 207
The other significant unsettled issue is the absence of judicial review and enforcement. There are no express powers of judicial review for alleged human rights violations identified in the
AICHR's Terms of Reference, or detailed guidelines for penalties or repercussions to be assessed on parties in violation of
human rights. 208 The commission itself is explicitly defined as a
"consultative body" to ASEAN, 209 and that decision-making be
made through "consultation and consensus." 210 There is no formal procedure for consultation and consensus, but if consensus is
not obtained about an issue, the ASEAN Charter dictates that
matter should then be referred to the heads of state at the
ASEAN Summit. 211 The Charter states that a "serious breach"
or "non-compliance" with its provisions is also referred to the
ASEAN Summit, 2 12 but there is no further guidance on how such
a matter would be handled, or what penalties or consequences
would be assessed on a member-state in breach of the Charter. 213
Reading both the ASEAN Charter and AICHR Terms of
Reference within the context of ASEAN's normative history,
seems to suggest that the commission's protective powers will207. See SC Tay, Human Rights: ASEAN's Way Forward, SINGAPORE INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (June 18, 2008), http://www.siiaonline.org/?q=

programmes/commentary/human-rights-asean%E2%80%99s-way-forward
("Consensus is the basic principle for the group. While the Charter does allow for an
"Asean minus X" formula, this is expressly limited to economic agreements. Maintaining Asean unity is key, especially on high-profile issues like human rights").
208. See Ginbar, supra note 170, at 514-15 (discussing the emphasis placed on
promotion by the AICHR's Terms of Reference, but no express language on a protection or enforcement mechanism for the body); Kelsall, supra note 202, at 3-4
(noting the ambiguity within the ASEAN Charter and AICHR Terms of Reference
in regards to review and enforcement).
209. AICHR, Terms of Reference supra note 189, 93.
210. Id. $6.1.
211. Charter, supra note 127, at art. 20, 11-4 (The process of consensus as practiced by ASEAN originates from long-held practices that emphasize discussion and
agreement, as opposed to conflict); AMITAv ACHARYA, CONSTRUCIlNG A SECUIZIY
COMMUNIrY IN SOUnEIsIsT AsIA: ASEAN AND Ti
PROBiiEM OF REGIONAL OR-

EiiR
77-79 (2001) (discussing the informal consensus process used by ASEAN leaders that has evolved over time); Davidson, supra note 88 (discussing the
predominant forms of decision-making within ASEAN). Arguably, such a practice
might be well-suited as a protocol for building relationships among heads of state or
other diplomatic activities among nations with histories of tension, such as in
ASEAN, but is not an appropriately formal or transparent mechanism for a body
with judicial review responsibilities.
212. Charter, supra note 127, at art. 20, 4 ("In the case of a serious breach of the
Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for
decision").
213. See Desierto, supra note 155, at 314 (discussing the problem of non-compliance with the Charter and noting that "[tihe Charter, however, is silent on what such
ASEAN Summit decisions could entail in actual practice.").
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at least for the immediate future-remain muted. The lack of a
textual foundation for the AICHR as a strong protective body
has led many human rights groups and civil society advocates to
criticize it for being "toothless" and "ineffective." 2 1 4 This understanding of the AICHR has been acknowledged by none other
than ASEAN leaders themselves. Regarding continuing criticism about the AICHR from civil society groups, ASEAN's Secretary-General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan recently remarked that "some
people might have wished for an independent organization or a
human rights court to conduct a review, but that's not what this
is."215 It should be noted that the AICHR's Terms of Reference,
like the ASEAN Charter, explicitly state that the AICHR does
have a mission to uphold "international human rights instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties." 216 This
clause provides some reason to believe that the AICHR may develop an affirmative agenda around those two treaties. 217 This
possibility has been heightened with the creation of the ASEAN
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of
Women and Children in 2010.218 However, this body's Terms of
Reference draw strongly from those of the AICHR, 219 indicating
the likelihood that it may retain a similarly soft role without viable protective and enforcement powers. 220

214. See AICHR: ASEAN's journey to human rights, JAKARTA POST (Indonesia),
Jan. 11, 2010, at 11 (discussing criticism of the AICHR for lacking enforcement powers); Don't celebrate just yet, many hurdles still ahead, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore),
(last visited July 25, 2012), http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/asco35-09.pdf
(discussing criticism of ASEAN and the AICHR for lacking "teeth" in enforcing
human rights violations); Ary Hermawan, Welcoming a half-baked ASEAN rights
body, JAKARTA PosT, Dec. 21, 2009, ("As an infantile institution, the first-ever

ASEAN human rights body launched in 2009 was not just weak and toothless, it was
almost universally decried as defective").
215. Ismira Lutfia, Questions Raised About Asean's Commitment to Human
Rights, JAKARTA GLoIIE, (last visited July 25, 2012), http://www.thejakartaglobe.

2 3
com/news/questions-raised-about-aseans-commitment-to-human-rights/455 1 .
216. AICHR, Terms of Reference supra note 189, 11.6.
217. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 194, at 23 (discussing potential options for the
development of an ASEAN human rights mechanism and suggesting that the
AICHR might develop a scope of responsibility around the CEDAW and CRC).
218. See Inaugurated:ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
the Rights of Women and Children, ASEAN BULLETIN (last visited July 25, 2012),
http://www.aseansec.org/24447.htm#Article-2.
219. ASEAN Commission for the Promotionand Protectionof the Rights of Women and Children (A CWC), Terms of Reference, ASEAN, available at http://www.
asean.org/documents/TOR-ACWC.pdf (last visited July 25, 2012).
220. See Ginbar, supra note 170, at 515-17 (discussing similarities between the
AICHR and ACWC).
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AS A HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION ENTITY

The AICHR's mandate to promote human rights has received less focus and criticism than its purported lack of protective elements. Again, it should be stated that the AICHR
developing into a strong, protective mechanism for human rights
with powers of judicial review and enforcement remains an ideal
objective. However, given the normative constraints noted previously, it is more likely that the AICHR in practice will evolve
into a body with much more of a promotional function than a
protective one, at least in the immediate future. If so, what might
a promotional agenda for the AICHR that would further human
rights and have a substantive program for environmental protection look like? The remainder of this article proposes that an
agenda which furthers the principles of proceduralenvironmental justice-as embodied in the Aarhus Convention-might be of
great benefit to ASEAN, specifically in the realm of public participation in environmental decision-making. A program of activities grounded in environmental public participation has
important normative potential for ASEAN's environmental policymaking practices, and would create a tangible and substantial
role for the AICHR that would maximize its promotional mission. Perhaps most importantly, furthering an agenda of public
participation in environmental matters would benefit policymaking communities within ASEAN nations, while simultaneously
working towards the wider objectives of good governance and
democratic practice without violating ASEAN norms of noninterference.
As previously noted, the ASEAN Charter itself makes express reference to principles of public participation in several
sections. Within ASEAN's internal decision-making circles, the
Charter was conceived as an instrument that would recognize the
importance of public participation to the wider communities of
people in member nations. The 2006 report by an internal advisory committee that precluded the actual Charter made explicit
recommendations that ASEAN move towards a "people-oriented" 22 1 direction. The report, drafted by a state-appointed
"Eminent Persons Group," 222 stated that:
ASEAN needs to shed its image of being an elitist organization comprising exclusively diplomats and government officials. More should be done to strengthen people-to-people
ties among ASEAN Member States, and to develop channels
to consult ASEAN institutions, Parliamentarians in ASEAN
221. REipoprr or nu EmINENT PE.RSONs Giiour ON nr ASEAN CHIA1;rn
(last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.aseansec.org/19247.pdf.

222.

Id. at 2.
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Member States (AIPA) and the people of ASEAN in all sectors of society. Their inputs can help strengthen cultural
awareness, forge closer common ASEAN identity and improve social development in ASEAN. The EPG recommends:
Cultivate ASEAN as a people-centered organization and to
strengthen the sense of ownership and belonging among its
people, including enhancing the participation of and interaction among Parliamentarians in ASEAN Member States
(AIPA), representatives of the civil society organizations, the
private business sector, human rights groups, academic institutions and other stakeholders in ASEAN. 223
This emphasis on the public's role in ASEAN policy manifests in
several Charter clauses. In its Preamble, ASEAN stands "resolved to ensure sustainable development for the benefit of present and future generations and to place the well-being,
livelihood and welfare of the peoples at the center of the
ASEAN community building process." 224 Additionally, the
Charter states among its list of ASEAN purposes to "enhance
the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing them with equitable access to opportunities for human development, social welfare and justice" 225 and to "promote a
people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of
ASEAN integration and community building." 226 Thus, there is
clear support for public involvement in governance and policy
generally in the ASEAN Charter.
V. INCREASING PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS AND
PROCESSES WITHIN THE AICHR AND ASEAN
A substantive commitment to public engagement beyond
the Charter's language could be directly achieved through the
formal recognition of rights to participation within any instruments developed by the AICHR. This approach would comport
with regional and global developments that have led to the recognition of rights to public participation in the Aarhus Convention. In the absence of such a formal recognition, ASEAN could
also strengthen participatory processes in its existing protocols or
practices, such as it has through its Guidelines for Civil Society
Organization participation, or by establishing new practices that
augment participation in decision-making. For reasons discussed
earlier, it is more likely that the Association will adopt the latter
path than the former and pursue a more gradual approach to223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 6.
Charter, supra note 127.
See id. at art. 1, Vl1.
See id. at art. 1, 113.
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wards expanding public involvement. The advantage of pursuing
this strategy is that it would align with an overall ASEAN milieu
that values policy directions which can be achieved through the
Association's consensus-based approach. It is also a matter of
institutional capacity. Because the AICHR-is at least for
now-unwilling to evolve into or create a separate adjudicative
body, the enunciation of further rights would seem a premature
step at this juncture since no regional judicial review body could
enforce such a right. Additionally, there are programs that the
AICHR could initiate that would strengthen public participation
in environmental matters within existing mechanisms that could
precede the ultimate or eventual development of a regional
human rights court.
There are both general steps that should be considered by
ASEAN policymakers, as well as specific changes that the
AICHR could implement, that would expand meaningful
processes for public participation in issues that span human
rights and environmental concerns. Challenges and possible advancements in participatory processes will be discussed in the
context of the Aarhus Convention's categorization of procedural
rights into three prongs-information, participation, and justice.
A.

ACCESS

TO INFORMATION

Advancing a participatory approach towards information access
through the AICHR could be well facilitated through the involvement of Civil Society Organizations ("CSOs"). Civil Society Organizations play an essential role in governance as public
interest advocates, watchdogs, and stakeholders with specialized
areas of expertise and constituencies. 227 As mediators between
states and citizens, CSOs are well-placed to advocate for public
interests generally and marginalized sectors that lack the capacity
to advocate within traditional bureaucracies. They can also play
a critical role in translating complex policy or technical issues
into more accessible formats, and increasing overall transparency
and capacities for engagement among common citizenry. 228
CSOs have made significant strides in these areas working within
the framework of United Nations bodies, particularly in the envi227. See Patrizia Nanz & Jans Steffek, Global Governance, Participationand the
Public Sphere, 39 GoVeRNMENT AND OPPOSITION: AN INT'L J. o COMP. POItICS
314, 315 (2004) (discussing the important role of civil society entities in public policy
and discourse generally).
228. See id. at 323 (2004) ("First, civil society organizations can give voice to
citizens' concerns and channel them into the deliberative process of international
organizations. Second, they can make the internal decision-making processes of international organizations more transparent to the wider public and formulate technical issues in accessible terms.").
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ronmental arena. 229 In Southeast Asia, CSOs are critical public
sphere actors since significant portions of citizenry still lack the
capacity to interface with entities such as the AICHR.
Within ASEAN, the Association maintains Guidelines on
ASEAN's Relations with Civil Society Organizations 230 that set
forth parameters for establishment of relations between CSOs
and the Association. These Guidelines set general criteria and
allow for procedures in which CSOs may be formally involved in
ASEAN activities. 231 Under the Guidelines, qualifying CSOs affiliated with ASEAN may have access to official ASEAN documentation on a selective basis. 232 Documentation such as
declarations, policy statements, and other material is available at
the ASEAN website. 233 However, the release of information is
limited. Transcripts of internal deliberations are not available,
and the actual decision-making process that takes place among
heads of state at ASEAN Summits remains largely opaque. 234 It
is unclear from the Charter's general language how decisions or
criteria for the availability of official documentation are made.
The Guidelines for participation indicate that for qualifying
CSOs, "[f]or purposes of doing research for its [the CSOs]
projects, it may be allowed access to the ASEAN documents on a
selective basis in consultation with the ASEAN Secretariat and
or its link body." 235 The AICHR's Terms of Reference are silent
on any aspects of informational access to the public or non-governmental organizations. According to the Terms, the AICHR
must submit an annual report to the ASEAN Foreign Minis229. See Barbara Gemmill & Abimbola Bamidele-Izu, The Role of NGOs and
Civil Society in Global Environmental Governance, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE: OPTIONS & OPPORTUNITIEs 1, 5-6 (D. C. Esty & M. H. Ivanova eds.,
2002) (discussing the role of NGOs within the United Nations).
230. Guidelines on ASEAN's Relations with Civil Society Organisations,
ASEAN, (last visited July 25, 2012), http://www.asean.org/18362.htm. [hereinafter
CSO Guidelines].
231. See Yves Bonzon, Institutionalizing Public Participationin WTO Decisionmaking: Some Conceptual Hurdles and Avenues, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 751, 766-68
(2008) (discussing the CSO guidelines for ASEAN).
232. See CSO Guidelines, supra note 230, 19 (stating that the qualifying CSO
"may be allowed access to the ASEAN documents on a selective basis in consultation with the ASEAN Secretariat and or its link body" but also noting that the
"ASEAN Secretariat shall provide CSOs with key ASEAN publications every
year").
233. See CRESENCIA MAURER, SUZANNE EHLERS & ANDREw BUCHMAN,
ALIGNING

COMMITMENTS:

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION,

INTERNATIONAL

DECISIoN-

-II ENVIRONMENT 13-15 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/aligning-commitments.pdf (highlighting examples of ASEAN documentation available online).
234. See id. at 16 ("ASEAN establishes complete confidentiality over its
deliberations").
235. CSO Guidelines supra note 230, T9.
MAKING, AND
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ters. 236 Since its formation, no reports of activities have been
made available to the public. Additionally, the AICHR has also
internally developed a 5 year work plan and rules of procedure
for the body. 2 37 However, details have yet to be made public
regarding either development.238 Because internal discussions
are kept secret and details only released incrementally in the
form of press releases, this has led human rights advocates to
criticize the AICHR for maintaining a "shroud of secrecy." 239
Both the AICHR and ASEAN generally should move towards releasing more documentation to the public, and clarifying
criteria and processes for public release of information. Clarification is needed specifically in the areas of how CSOs or members of the public may formally request documentation that is
not readily available online or in paper records, and how decisions regarding access to documentation are made. Requests for
such access and corresponding decisions should be recorded and
also be made publicly available. A CSO advisory body should be
created to recommend processes for access to information. 240
The World Trade Organization's presentation of documentation
online serves as a positive model that the AICHR and ASEAN
could aspire to. 24 1 Following the WTO's approach, a blanket
presumption of access to meeting minutes and other documentation should be created after a reasonable amount of time has
passed. 242 A general rule should be established that all relevant
236. AICHR, Terms of Reference supra note 189, 4.13.
237. Press Release of the Fifth ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on
Human Rights, ASEAN, (last visited July 25,2012), http://www.asean.org/26208.htm
(noting discussion of five year work plan and rules of procedure and other progress

made by AICHR); Press Release of the Sixth ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, ASEAN (last visited July 25, 2012), availableat http://www.
asean.org/26456.htm (noting further discussion of the five year work plan and

budgct and rules of procedure).
238. SAPA TASK FORCE ON

ASEAN AN) HUMAN RiGirrs, HIDING BEIINI) ITS
LIMrrs: A PERFORMANCE REPORr ON THE FIRST YEAR OF TIE ASEAN INTERGOV-

ERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIorrs (AICHR) 5-6 (2010) (last visited July
25, 2012), available at http://forum-asia.org/2010/Report%20on%20AICHR%27s%
20first%20year%20_for_dist.pdf (discussing the secretive nature of internal AICHR
deliberations).
239. Id. at 5.
240. See UNIT
NArIONs ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, STRENGTHENING INTEIRNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL. GOVERNANCE AND CIvIL SocITY LEADERSHIP IN
TiHE ASIA-PAcInc 29 (2008) (recommending similar strategies for the United Nations' environment and development programs).

241. See Nanz & Steffek, supra note 227, at 327 ("By now, the WTO's presentation of documents on the internet is regarded to be among the best of all public
international organizations in terms of content and user guidance").

242. See The General Council's Crowded Agenda for Last Regular Meeting,
BIuDGHS BETWIEN TRADE AND SusTAINAniji DIVELOPMENTr (INTERNATIONAL
CENTER ii FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINAnius DevELorMENT, GENEVA, SwnrFIRIAND),

Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://ictsd.org/
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policy decision-making information should be made publicly
available. 24 3 A presumption in favor of access to information as
opposed to restriction would clarify the process to obtaining information and comport with the ASEAN Charter's spirit of public participation.
Additionally, although some documentation is available on
the ASEAN website in English, the official working language of
the Association, greater efforts could be made to translate more
material into the regional languages of member-states, particularly its most important texts. Maintaining documentation only
in English restricts access of this material to government elites
and selective academic or non-governmental entities. ASEAN
does maintain a separate webpage for environmental matters, including information on environmental governance within
ASEAN, specific reports on the ASEAN environment, and the
status of ASEAN member-state ratification of international environmental agreements. 24 4 However, all documentation is in English only and relatively scant. Developing an online public
information center or clearing house in multiple languages would
greatly enhance the degree to which the public could access important ASEAN documentation, similar to those maintained by
the secretariats of several multilateral environmental
agreements. 245
B. PARTICIPATION
Participation in ASEAN policymaking follows traditional patterns of multi-track diplomacy. 246 Here again, CSOs play a critical role. The Guidelines on ASEAN's Relations with Civil
Society Organizations outline general parameters for Track II
downloads/bridges/bridges4-9.pdf (discussing external transparency concerns in the
WTO and referring to Norway's request to automatically de-restrict documentation
about a suitable time frame).
243. ECOLOGIC INSTITUTE, PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

GOVERNANCE: LEGAL BASIS

AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE 247 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://

ecologic.eu/download/projekte/1850-1899/1890/report ngos en.pdf (calling for access to all policy-relevant information in environmental governance generally).
244. See Main Page, Our Life, Our Future, Environment (last visited July 25,
2012), available at http://environment.asean.org/.
245. See MAURER ET AL., supra note 233, at 9-12 (discussing informational access

to the public in the context of several existing international conventions for the
environment).
246. For overviews of participatory mechanisms in international institutions, see

generally Steve Charnovitz, The Emergence of Democratic Participationin Global
Governance (Paris,1919), 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL Swuo. 45 (2003); Jens Steffek

& Ulrike Ehling, Civil Society Participation at the WTO - A Cure for its Democratic Deficit? paper presented at 3rd ECPR General Conference, Budapest (last
visited July 25, 2012) (available at http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/DOCS/
P11 DO]L-Steffek Ehling-CivilSociety-Participation-at the_WT.Ov2.pdf.).
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CSO involvement in ASEAN processes. Officially affiliated organizations may submit written statements or recommendations
on policy issues to ASEAN through its secretariat, 247 and participate in meetings of associated ASEAN mechanisms at the discretion of ASEAN. 248 Qualifying CSOs are subject to requirements
for affiliation with ASEAN, including an obligation to "advance
ASEAN interests and promote the awareness of ASEAN's principles and activities." 2 4 9 The officially affiliated CSOs are listed
in an annex of the ASEAN Charter, 250 and include the Working
Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism-which maintains a dialogue with the AICHR as it continues its development. 251 The Charter's official designation of these entities as
Track II dialogue partners certainly bolsters the legal relevance
of these relationships. CSOs undoubtedly play a critical role in
ASEAN as watchdogs and advocates for communities and sectors that are excluded from Track I dialogue, particularly because
the civil society infrastructure in the region generally is still in the
process of development. 252 However, critics have asserted that
many of these officially recognized Track II CSOs are largely creations of various member-state governments which have policy
goals that align with or accommodate those of ASEAN. 253 Since
2005, there has also been an ASEAN People's Assembly composed of representatives from various, officially affiliated CSOs
that meets on an annual basis in step with ASEAN Summits. 254
People's Assembly conferences conclude with the reading of a

247. CSO Guidelines, supra note 230, 19b.
248. Id. at 99e.
249. Id. at 111b.
250. ASEAN Charter, Annex 2, Entities Associated with ASEAN.
251. See Working Group Meets with the A ICHR; Discusses Engagements and Activities, WORKING GROUP FOR AN ASEAN HUMAN RiGirrs MECHANISM, http://
www.aseanhrmech.org/news/working-group-meets-aichr-engagements-and-activites.
htm (last visited July 25, 2012).
252. See Charnovitz,supra note 246, at 58-59 (discussing the relevance of NGOs
generally in international governance); DANIl E. RYAN, INTEGRATING DEVEI-OPMENT AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION INTO IN-E7RNATIONAiL ENVIRONMENTAL GovENVIRONMENTAL
ERNANCE: A LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECrIVE ON A WoiuL
ORGANIZATION 7-8 (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.farn.org.ar/

docs/artl6.pdf (discussing NGO involvement and roles as civil society representa-

tives in international governance).
253. See DANG TiI THU HUONG, EXAMINING THEi ENGAGEMENT BIETWEEN
CivIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN IN THE ASEAN CIIARTER PROCEss 7-8, 14 (last visited
July 25, 2012), available at http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/120420/examining-the-

engagement-between-civil-society-and-asean-in-the-asean-charter (discussing the dialogue partner process with ASEAN and its overall parameters).
254. See Bonzon, supra note 231, at 768 (discussing the ASEAN People's
Assembly).
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common civil society statement to ASEAN heads of state. 255
These meetings were produced as a result of Track II dialogues
with ASEAN, and thus have official recognition from ASEAN,
but have been criticized as largely symbolic exercises. 256 For
these reasons, the majority of CSOs that have been excluded
from Track II dialogues have coordinated initiatives to develop
alternative forums for civil society participation in ASEAN, but
lacking consistent support and official recognition from
ASEAN.257
As the entity charged with promoting and protecting human
rights throughout ASEAN, it is critical that the AICHR set a
precedent for creating meaningful spaces for participation in
human rights and environmental dialogue by civil society. The
establishment of direct dialogues with CSOs through the Charter
is a positive step, but a number of other approaches should be
used to widen the scope and impact of public participation in policy making. First, existing dialogue practices with ASEAN generally should be both expanded and made more transparent.
Limiting input of written policy views or recommendations to officially affiliated CSOs which have been selected by ASEAN is
too restrictive, and currently excludes the participation of numerous smaller CSOs/NGOs across the region. As a general presumption, any CSO willing to follow established protocols should
have a right to be involved in decision and policy making procedures.258 CSOs have a critical role in providing expert, countryspecific information on environmental or human rights information to the AICHR and ASEAN generally. The AICHR should
develop and codify formal rules of procedure that allow for the
submission of written comment by any member of the public or
entity into concerns about practices or policies within memberstates that implicate human rights outcomes and/or environmental issues. Formal submissions of information should be documented and made publicly available. 259 A regular reporting
mechanism in which national CSOs provide annual reports to the
AICHR and ASEAN on human rights and environmental issues
255. See Id. ("It is convened several days ahead of ASEAN Summits and adopts
a common statement of civil society organizations, which is then read to the Heads
of State during their Summit.").
256. See Huong, supra note 253, at 16.
257. See id. at 16-18 (discussing the formation of the ASEAN Civil Society Conferences); see generally Ramirez, supra note 89 (discussing civil society development
and engagement with ASEAN generally).
258. See ECoLOGIC, supra note 243, at 246 (recommending wide inclusion
among NGOs in environmental governance activities within international bodies).
259. See Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu, supra note 229, at 15-16 (recommending various civil society participation approaches in international environmental
governance).
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should be established. Online mechanisms may offer efficient
and transparent means for CSOs to provide written input to the
AICHR about concerns which involve human rights. The
AICHR could also establish national offices or online portals to
create a permanent infrastructure for input by domestic CSOs
and members of the public. Special forums could be created specifically for formal presentations of information and policy
stances by CSOs within the AICHR and ASEAN generally, 260
with protocols codified in organizational rules. Obviously, means
to monitor follow-up by the AICHR and ASEAN in environmental and human rights decision-making activities should also
be implemented.
Outside of CSO participation in ASEAN decision-making
organs, a particularly good model for involving members of the
lay public in environmental decision-making are Environmental
Impact Assessments. 261 The Impact Assessment Model is aimed
at documenting possible consequences of a development project
on surrounding communities. 262 Environmental Assessments
have already been employed in various Southeast Asian nations,
usually for large development projects financed by regional or
international development banks, but also for domestic-financed
operations. 263 Human Rights Impact Assessments have likewise
developed and continue to be used in various contexts, particularly in regards to international trade. 264 The AICHR could de260. See UNIfED NATIONs ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 240, at 29
(recommending similar strategies for inclusion of NGOs in the United Nations' environment and development programs).
261. For discussions on the environmental impact assessment model and experiences, see generally Ann-Katrin Baicklund, Impact Assessment in the European
Commission - a System with Multiple Objectives, 12 ENVrL. ScL & PoL'Y 1077,
1077-1087 (2009); Neil Craik, Deliberationand Legitimacy in TransnationalGovernance: The Case of Environmental Impact Assessments, 38 VIcrORIA U. W! IAuNGrON
L. REv. 381, 381-402 (2007); Patricia Fitzpatrick, Multi-jurisdictionalEnvironmental
Impact Assessment: Canadian Experiences, 29 ENVrL. IM'Acr ASSESSMENT REv.
252, 252-60 (2009).
262. See generally JoHN GLAssON, RIKI TiIRIVAL & ANDREW CHADWICK, INTRODUCION To ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAcr Ass.SSMENT 2-25 (3d ed. 2005) (describing overall parameters and objectives of environmental impact assessments).

263. See generally John Stampe, Lessons Learned from Environmental Impact
Assessments: A Look at Two Widely Different Approaches - The USA and Thailand,
8 J. TRANSoISCIrLINARY ENVrTL. STuD. 1 (2009) (discussing the use of environmental assessments in Thailand); Jennifer C. Li, Environmental Impact Assessments in
Developing Countries: An Opportunity for Greater Environmental Security? 7-16
(USAID, Working Paper No. 4, 2008) (outlining the use of environmental impact

assessments in Mekong River Delta nations).
264. See generally James Harrison, Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade
Agreements: Reflections on Practice and Principlesfor Future Assessments, paper for
the Expert Seminar on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment
Agreements, Geneva (June 23-24, 2010) (providing an overview of human rights
impact assessments in the global trade context); Alessa Goller & James Harrison,
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velop a regime for promoting the increased use of such
assessments at a domestic level among member-states. This
would be particularly warranted because existing impact assessment practices in Southeast Asia are generally perceived to be
weaker than in developed nations due to lack of training, minimal commitment by national agencies, and other factors. 265 Regional harmonization of impact assessments and training through
the AICHR would help develop local governmental and nongovernmental capacities to administer such assessments, provide
them with the visibility and credibility they deserve, and would
certainly align with the AICHRs mandate to promote human
rights regionally.
C. JUSTICE
The final prong of the Aarhus Convention-access to justicewill be the most difficult of the three procedural rights to obtain
within the current AICHR context because it directly implicates
the need for a judicial review role, which currently does not exist
in the AICHR. Without a regional human rights court, ASEAN
would be faced with two significant structural problems. First,
any adjudication of regional rights would be restricted to interpretation in national and sub-national contexts only, amounting
to a diffuse interpretation and enforcement of regionally-recognized rights. Although it could be argued that the legal systems
and cultures of some ASEAN nations might be sufficiently prepared to formally adjudicate such claims, it is difficult to imagine
the same happening in member-states like Myanmar or the de
jure communist nations like Vietnam or Laos. Secondly, there
would be no regional-level appellate body to review either alleged infringements by states, or to adjudicate disputes between
member-states. Unless the AICHR does develop itself into an
adjudicative body, or ASEAN develops a related entity with such
powers, any meaningful provisions related to access to justice will
likely remain unfulfilled.
VI. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the fact that a regional human rights body has
been created by ASEAN is significant in itself, and it should be
Trade and Human Rights: What Does 'Impact Assessment' Have to Offer? 8 Hum.
Ri-s. L. REV. 587 (2008) (discussing human rights impact assessments generally and
their value).
265. See generally John Boyle, Cultural Influences on Implementing Environmental Impact Assessment: Insights from Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, 18 ENvri.
IMPAcr AssiEssMEwN Ri'vmew 95 (1998) (discussing institutional and social factors
that undermine the effective use of environmental impact assessments in Thailand,
Indonesia and Malaysia).
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seen for what it is: a starting point. 26 6 The Terms of Reference
for the AICHR indicate that ASEAN purposively intended that
the commission develop and evolve over time by adopting "an
evolutionary approach that would contribute to the development
of human rights norms and standards in ASEAN."'267 Given
long-standing practices within ASEAN, it can be expected that
any path towards evolving a regional human rights regime will be
an incremental one. At the same time, the pace of development
in Southeast Asia and accompanying environmental concerns
will continue to grow. It is therefore critical that a milieu be developed for the communities and peoples of ASEAN to have
meaningful opportunities to participate in policy decisions that
implicate the environment, within a political context that is viable for the region.
An agenda for growing practices that allow for greater public participation in ASEAN policy reflects the Association's new
Charter. Additionally, the recent creation of the AICHR creates
opportunities to centralize and develop procedures and practices
for public participation in environmental policy as a function of
its mission as the region's human rights body. Although it is unclear if the procedural rights in the Aarhus Convention will be
recognized by the AICHR, the strengthening of participatory
practices would serve to at least be a positive interim development that could set the stage for a more effective human rights
enforcement mechanism within ASEAN. Also, fostering participatory practices within ASEAN is a positive end in itself, particularly in the context of promoting sustainable development.
Effectively engaging the public promotes informed policy decision-making and can mitigate unequal distributions in both information and power. 268 Participation is a critical component of
transparency and accountability. 269 From a pragmatic standpoint, involving the public in environmental policymaking can
lead to greater public acceptance of development projects, and
pre-empt social conflict, wide-scale protests, lawsuits, or other
266. See Michelle Staggs Kelsall, The New ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: Toothless Tiger or Tentative First Step (Asia Pacific Issues,
number 90, Sept. 2009) (discussing the broad issues surrounding the creation of the
AICHR); Hao Duy Phan, The ASEAN Inter-GovernmentalCommission on Human
Rights and Beyond, AsIA PACiic BuiturmIN (EAsT-WEsT CENTInR, WASHINGrON,

DC), (last visited July 25, 2012), available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/
default/files/private/apb04O_1.pdf (outlining the AICHR and noting its importance
as a significant step towards other developments in the area).
267. AICHR, Terms of Reference, supra note 189, $2.5.
268. See Ryan, supra note 252, at 7 (discussing the importance of public participation within the context of sustainable development).
269.

See MAURER Er AL., supra note 233, at 1-2 (discussing benefits of public

participation in multilateral and international governance).
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adverse or disruptive developments that can result from not effectively engaging impacted peoples and communities in a meaningful way. 270 Integrating such procedural practices into
ASEAN's new human rights machinery may not be the ideal outcome. However, it would amount to a significant step forward in
ASEAN's slow march towards strengthening regional human
rights, and would offer novel movement in integrating environmental concerns into its new rights-based framework.

270.
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DC), June 2010 at 5 (outlining benefits of public participation in environmental
matters).

